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ABSTRACT
Spanish rule in Louisiana was bracketed by periods of unrest. Using the criteria for
rebellion developed by political scientist Claude E. Welch Jr., in Anatomy of Rebellion to
compare the 1768 rebellion under Governor Antonio de Ulloa, and demonstrations of discontent
in the 1790’s under Baron Francisco Luis Carondelet, one is able to draw out similarities,
contrasts, and continuities in factors causal to political unrest. The most powerful of these causal
factors were the economic troubles, geographic marginality, ethnic tensions, weak authority, and
unsuccessful attempts to reform the colony’s commercial system. Methods employed by the
Spanish administrations to contain or mitigate the discontent largely failed, leading to episodes
of violent popular political contention.
The roots of Louisiana’s problems ran deep. By the arrival of the Spaniards, the colony
had been largely neglected by the French crown. Suffering shortages of food, and economic
strife, the colonial elite formed their own alternate, and often illegal, structures of power and
support. The 1766 imposition of Spanish rule threatened those structures. In 1768, discontented
members of the Louisiana Superior Council staged a coup, driving Spanish governor Antonio de
Ulloa out of the colony. Lieutenant General Alejandro O’Reilly restored order to the colony in
1769. O’Reilly demonstrated effective means of control over a discontented populace, which
stood in stark relief to the weaknesses, neglect and disorder of the previous Spanish
administration.
In the early 1790’s a number of factors sparked new fears of rebellion in Louisiana.
Disruptions of trade caused by war with France, attempts to integrate Louisiana into the Spanish
mercantile system, shifts in agriculture and a shortage of specie backed currency once again
agitated the colonial elite. At the same time an influx of revolutionary propaganda from the
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French Republic threatened to spark old ethnic tensions while tales of the Haitian revolution
brought fears of slave revolt in the colony. Baron Carondelet utilized an increased military
presence, information control, incorporation of colonial leaders into his administrative structure,
and the fear of slave revolt to contain demonstrations of popular discontent. While his
administration saw an increase in political violence, Carondelet prevented widespread rebellion.

vi

INTRODUCTION
Spanish rule provided the Louisiana territory with a period of organization and orderly
development that sparked colonial growth in a way the previous French administrations never
had. Yet, the period of Spanish rule over the Louisiana territory was contentious and bracketed
by rebellion. In 1768, three years into the Spanish occupation, French ‘habitants’ challenged the
rule of Antonio de Ulloa y de la Torre-Guiral, the first Spanish Governor of Louisiana.1 French
and German settlers rose up and ousted Ulloa from power. Their interim government sought to
restore the colony to French control but Spanish reinforcements, led by Alejandro O’Reilly,
restored Spanish rule. Toward the end of the Spanish period of Louisiana’s history, the colony
saw tumults involving French agents, American speculators, colonial planters, merchants and
rebellious slaves inspired by the French and Haitian Revolutions. However unlike Ulloa before
him, Governor Baron Francisco Luis Hector De Carondelet managed to retain power throughout
the length of his administration, though there were periods when his control was limited.
This thesis was written to explore several questions related to rebellion during the
Spanish regime in Louisiana. Why should one governor seem to fail so thoroughly in
maintaining order, while another succeeded? Is there continuity between the rebellions? And
were these rebellions purely derived from the peasant revolt tradition, or were they more
revolutionary in nature? The hope is that the answers to these questions may inform us about the
changing character of the colony throughout the Spanish regime. In doing so they may also
highlight changes in Spanish methods of colonial control, and perhaps give some insight into
pre-industrial rebellion.
1

The term ‘habitant’ was used by the Spanish to denote a citizen of the Louisiana territory who had French
heritage. Additionally ‘Creole’ is often used to describe Frenchmen, born in Louisiana. During the eighteenth
century the appellation ‘Acadian’ was used primarily to refer to French colonists from Acadia, who had been forced
out by the English.
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Initial inquiries into the two revolts revealed several related causes for the unrest: racial
and ethnic tensions, economic distress, food and supply shortages, geographic isolation,
revolutionary zeal, manipulation by outside forces, and the disruption of entrenched cultural
norms and mores. Both also showed signs of economic motivation, social strain from a shift in
commercial practice, and ethnic tension between the French and Spanish. These economic and
social factors suggested a connection to the ‘peasant revolt’ or ‘popular revolt’ tradition. To a
degree, the rebellions conform to the basic peasant revolt model: a people at the bottom of the
social order participating in unrest to assert rights considered traditionally theirs, or to protect a
basic standard of living.
The author of this thesis obtained unusable results from reading histories of medieval
rebellions for the purpose of creating a kind of platonic model of peasant revolts to use as a
“lens” to examine the 1768 revolt and the 1790’s turmoil. Many of those texts focused on
specific religious, legal and agricultural innovations which seemed too contextually bound to
medieval Europe to be of much use. A broader approach to the subject of rebellion was needed.
Fortunately, while searching political science texts for insight the author stumbled upon Claude
E. Welch Jr.’s Anatomy of a Rebellion, which provided a suitable framework.2
Welch’s model mines the physical, economic, and social setting of a series of revolts for
indicators of popular political violence. These indicators included physical setting, the social
and cultural bases for political action, situational conditions, and actions taken by the dominant
or ruling authorities which might have had influences on the likelihood of rebellion – for
example: the imposition of a minority or alien rule over an indigenous people.

2

Claude E. Welch, Jr., Anatomy of a Rebellion, (Albany: State University Press of New York, 1980), 1. Welch
analyzes the Taiping Rebellion in China (1850-1964), the Telengana Rebellion in India (1946-1951), the Mau Mau
Rebellion in Kenya (1952-1956) and the Kwilu Rebellion in Zaire (1963-1965).
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Physical settings conducive to unrest, rebellion and even revolution include remoteness
from central power, a borderland situation, the nature of “frontier” societies, the impact that
repeated natural disasters can have on popular perception of government, and changes in
agricultural systems. Authorities find it difficult to control geographically marginal areas. The
primary reason for this is often the physical distance, difficulty or travel, or contested zones of
control which limits the government’s ability to easily reach the people in question. The limited
interaction with the central authority often engenders a sense of separation.
Borderlands prove problematic for the central authority because it is often not able to
exert its full power there because of an unwillingness to risk conflict with a neighbor state.
Traits useful to coping with the isolation of frontier life also are likely to foster a sense of
autonomy, if not hostility to the central authority. Members of the rural frontier are often
independent, mobile, resistant to outside influence, and prize self sufficiency. The result of these
factors is an area of weak and confused government, conditions that are favorable to the
fomenting of dissent.
Experiencing repeated natural disasters that cause repeated large scale losses of life and
property make populations more prone to rebellion, according to Welch. Disasters, like any
other crisis situation, stress the resources available, exacerbating existing tensions and creating
new ones. These disasters, when repeated often enough, can encourage a kind of “millenarian
thinking” – the expectations of large scale, wide spread change, which can broaden the view of
the populace to accept other radical changes.3 Another large problem with disaster prone areas,
perhaps one even larger than the strained resources, is that they highlight inefficiencies in the
government and create the perception of a lack of support for the population. The government
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Ibid., 26.
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often either becomes a scapegoat or is shown in the worst possible light. This is greatly
compounded when combined with changes in social values and commerce.4
Another potential precondition for rebellion in pre-modern societies, especially in
geographically marginal areas, according to Welch, are changes in their agricultural bases He
identified land scarcity, inequitable land ownership, and disruptions in social structures caused
by a change away from subsistence farming to a commercial model as potential sources of
unrest. Too, social problems, including organized unrest, also have a tendency to occur when
population growth outpaces agricultural development.5
The social and cultural bases for political action and the situational conditions that foster
discontent and rebellion are complex. Some have already been indicated under the heading of
geographical marginality. Others arise from the conditions needed for collective action.
Individual complaints, however valid they may be, Welch contends, are not an adequate
basis for collective action. The reasoning behind this seems obvious, if not semantic; individual
action is individual and by definition collective action requires a group. In order to successfully
launch a campaign of collective action, the complaints of inequity or inequality of the individual
must be generalized and applied to a group. Often some piece of the existing social structure can
be used as a means for this generalization. Welch describes four major means of group self
ascription, or the establishing of a communal identity, that he found in his studies. The first is
through ascribing cultural ties based on ethnicity or language. Religious beliefs and
millenarianism are also means for linking individuals. Economic ties between members of the
rural poor can also foster solidarity through class awareness and action. Finally political
4

Ibid., 26-27; Guy Fourquin, The Anatomy of Popular Rebellion in the Middle Ages, (Amsterdam: North
Holland Publishing Company, 1978), 130.
5

Welch, 27.
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boundaries can provide unity at the same time that they set the scope of the action. Distance
between individuals can limit the ability of the discontented to act collectively, while at the same
time strengthening bonds amongst those within close reach of each other.6
Both discontented agitators and ineffective action by the incumbent governors will have a
hand in the politicization of discontent. The most common factor in rebellion, Welch asserts, is
the perception of relative deprivation - a view the rebels have that they are being denied basic
rights and/or opportunities that they are entitled to. Perceived weakness or ineffectual use of
force by the incumbents can be another force pushing discontented subjects toward
politicization. A strong indigenous leadership and strong organization on the side of the
discontented are both contributing factors as well. One final major consideration that Welch
takes account of is the inclusion of justifications for mobilization in the belief structure of the
indigenous populace. Such a structure makes political action far likelier.7
Welch’s model for politicization of discontent loosely follows the following formula.
Discontent gives rise to a sense of relative deprivation in members of rural communities. Self
ascription of like traits begins to allow those discontented to consider themselves part of a larger
group, or deprived class. Members of the now more consolidated disaffected groups begin to
seek meaningful reform to the sources of discontent. The incumbent government reacts to the
requests for reform in a way that exacerbates the discontent of the groups – often through
unnecessary or ineffective force. The groups then seek an ideological foundation of generalized
beliefs for their movement, using them to both define their movement and to outline their plan
for a better society.8
6

Welch, 36.

7

Ibid., 123-124.
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Ibid., 124-125.
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Because one of the key differences between rebellion and revolution is success, the
actions of the rulers in attempting to prevent or quiet unrest are also critical. Welch cites four
maxims for the successful leader to live by. Firstly, the leader must keep the population from
gaining political savvy, and keep members of the populace divided. At the same time the impact
of the government must be felt as little as possible so as to not give cause to uprising; minimal
government involvement also lessens the expectations of the people toward the government.
This maxim is supported by the frequently observed links between rebellion and the imposition
of new or raised taxes. The second maxim states that the leader must maintain a system of
values justifying the stratification of power, and inculcate those values in the populace. The
third maxim states the need for the leader to create a means for the indigenous people – in the
case of empires – to be incorporated into the system. In doing so the system becomes
legitimized to the social structure through those who enter into it. Finally, the leader must be
able to employ coercion successfully. However the maxim also cautions that a leader should not
overuse political and physical force. Doing so strains relations with the locals and risks exposing
the minority rulers to a larger force than can be controlled.9
Ultimately collective political violence is a result of bad governance. The ignoring or
misreading of discontent sets the stage for the growth and development of that discontent into
political action. What keeps that political action from becoming revolution instead of rebellion?
Welch suggests four major conditions that need to be met for a revolution. There needs to be a
clear social polarization. The government needs to be inept to a certain degree in recognizing
and responding to the needs of the populace as well as inept in its ability to control the political
action. The insurrection needs to come from a combination of urban and rural dissatisfaction,

9

Ibid., 79-81, 86, 89.
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and reach across both sections of the society. Finally the goals of the political action need to be
incompatible with the existing legal and political means to meet them. Without these conditions
the collective political action is not likely to evolve into a large scale, radical, lasting change.10
A factor that Welch overlooks but that is important for understanding the events of 1768
and the 1790s in Spanish Louisiana is the personalities of the Spanish governors.. His new
subjects perceived the very first governor of Spanish Louisiana, Antonio de Ulloa, as aloof and
uninterested in their welfare. After Ulloa’s failure to control the colony, Alejandro O’Reilly was
sent by Spain to restore Spanish control. O’Reilly was forceful but also engaged with the local
population. His changes in policies and reshaping of colonial law changed and set the colony’s
Francophone population’s perception of the Spaniards for some time. Baron Francisco Luis
Hector De Carondelet, the seventh Spanish governor of the colony, who administered Louisiana
during the unrest of the 1790’s presented his subjects with a mixture of the traits of Ulloa and
O’Reilly as well as what seems at this remove to have been a touch of paranoia about the
revolutionary potential of the population during the most radical phase of the French Revolution
of 1789-1814. The importance of the personalities of these men will become evident in the
discussion that follows.
The thesis is divided into three chapters bracketed by this introduction, which includes a
brief historiography of topics related to unrest in Spanish Louisiana, and a conclusion. The first
chapter is a recounting of the revolt of 1768. Emphasis is placed on the geographical, social and
economic strains that sat at the core of the colonists’ discontents. Care is also taken to study the
motives, resources and ideologies of the more important of the principal plotters in the Superior
Council. Ultimately Governor Ulloa’s failure to hold the colony represents a strong example of
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Ibid., 314-315, 328-329, 333 -334.
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poor colonial governance. Governmental policy that either encouraged discontent or acted to
pacify the revolt is presented. Finally, the days of “rebel rule” are studied with an eye toward
efforts made by the interim regime to ease discontent, it’s implementation of ideology and
attempts it made to satisfy promises made by the coup leaders.
The return of Spanish order signaled by the arrival of Lieutenant General Alejandro
O’Reilly is the subject of the second chapter. O’Reilly’s return was met with little resistance and
the restoration of Spanish rule occurred with almost no bloodshed. What violence did occur was
almost entirely the result of orderly trials, and despite the appellation “Bloody O’Reilly”, only
six lives were taken. Chapter three is mostly a study of effective means of counter-rebellion as
practiced by the Lieutenant General. The measures introduced by O’Reilly to restore order, as
well as their effectiveness is presented and compared against Welch’s model as a means to
contrast them with to those employed by Governor Ulloa, and compare them with the more
successful policies of Carondelet.
The third chapter of this thesis is an exploration of the turmoil that gripped Louisiana
under the administration of Baron Carondelet. A number of important local and international
events occurred during Carondelet’s time as governor. These events, such as the French
Revolution and subsequent slave revolt in St. Domingue (Haiti), as well as speculators and
adventurers movements to expand outside of the United States’ borders, serve to show the
international scope of problems that gripped the colony as well as the fluidity of the region’s
many borders. Local issues such as inhospitable terrain, ethnic tensions, lack of specie and
natural disaster are also treated, as they were in chapter two. Baron Carondelet’s effectiveness in
maintaining order in these circumstances is also explored with emphasis on the social and
political efforts of the Baron.

8

The conclusion is a comparison of those factors summarized in the previous three
chapters. It follows the order of Welch’s criteria for rebellion. Thus, the conclusion considers
the physical setting for the rebellions, the bases for collective political action and the steps taken
to politicize the residents’ discontents. Incumbent responses as well as an analysis of the rebel
leadership are presented. Following that is a summary comparison of the incumbent powers’
steps to pacify the subjects.
There are a number of documentary collections that serve as great resources for
transcribed letters. Principle among these is the Annual Report of the American Historical
Association for the year 1945 in Four Volumes: Spain in the Mississippi Valley, 1765-1794,
edited by Lawrence Kinnaird. Kinnaird’s four volume series of translated materials covers a
wide range of subjects and chronology. Kinnaird adds insightful introductions to each part and
the translations themselves contain a reasonable amount of annotation through judicious
footnotes. Of particular use to this study were Part I, The Revolutionary Period, 1765-1781, and
Part III, Problems of Frontier Defense, 1792-1794. Louis Houck’s two volumes of The Spanish
Regime in Missouri: A collection of papers and documents relating to upper Louisiana
principally within the present limits of Missouri during the dominion of Spain, from the Archives
of the Indies at Seville, etc., translated from the original Spanish into English, and including also
some papers concerning the supposed grant to Col. George Morgan at the mouth of the Ohio,
found in the Congressional Library, carries on in a vein similar to Kinnaird’s work, though
smaller in scope. Other lengthy translations are presented in journal publications, most notably
issues of the Louisiana Historical Quarterly published by the Louisiana Historical Society, and
bound essay collections like John Francis McDermott’s The Spanish in the Mississippi Valley,
1762-1804.

9

Perhaps the best collection of essays and articles on colonial Louisiana can be found in
The Louisiana Purchase Bicentennial Series in Louisiana History Volume I, The French
Experience in Louisiana, edited by Glenn R. Conrad and Volume II, The Spanish Presence in
Louisiana, edited by Gilbert C. Din. These essays, taken from a variety of authors, are arranged
by theme and create a kind of patchwork map to social, economic and political development
throughout the colonial period.
This thesis was greatly informed by works of Carl Brasseaux. Particularly useful were
his works on the Acadian experience in Louisiana. Brasseaux’s French, Cajun, Creole, Houma:
A Primer on Francophone Louisiana, and his The Founding of New Acadia: The Beginnings of
Acadian Life in Louisiana, 1765-1803 were useful in delineating the differences among the
unique groups of French-speaking colonists that lived in Louisiana during the Spanish regime.
The Founding of New Acadia was also useful because of its thoughtful examination of the
relationship between the Acadians and the French Creoles of the colony, and how each group
related to the Spanish administration. Together these works greatly expand the dualistic view of
Franco-Spanish relations.
Many early histories, like Charles Gayarré’s History of Louisiana, take a “soup to nuts”
approach to the history of Louisiana (at least after European settlement). They begin with the
French settlement of the territory and progress through early statehood. This approach lends
them a “long view” approach which helps contextualize the independent chapters of the state’s
history in terms of a greater narrative – often told in the progressive terms of advanced reform
lifting the territory out of a relative social and economic morass. These earlier histories also tend
to contain much transcribed and translated material from the French and Spanish archives,
respectively.

10

With regard to the rebellion of 1768, the early historians of Spanish Louisiana fall into
one of two camps. The first set of historians wrote their works based primarily on French
sources. Historiography in this camp is usually biased toward the French Creoles and critical of
the Spaniards. Such histories as Alcée Fortier’s A History of Louisiana and François Xavier
Martin’s The History of Louisiana, From the Earliest Period treat the French and Creole subjects
as martyr heroes. They also typically demonize the Spaniards – particularly those in command
of the colony during the periods of French unrest, in often striking, if not purple, prose such as
Fortier’s description of Lieutenant General Alejandro O’Reilly as “lack[ing] tact,…[and] act[ing]
with unpardonable duplicity and cruelty in 1769.”11 Later historians, focusing on the extensive
Spanish records, were kinder to the first two Spanish administrations. Perhaps the most notable
of these scholars was Charles Gayarré, whose History of Louisiana presents the Spaniards as
reformers bogged down by recalcitrant, prejudiced, and, perhaps most importantly, fiercely
independent French colonists.
On the whole the bias of these works is easy to work around; one has to look for the
obvious vituperations and take characterizations with due consideration of the source. If the
biases can be looked past, these sources provide a wealth of factual information, and were
written with a definite sense of closeness to the events described – as in some cases the authors
(e.g. Martin) are only a generation or two removed.
Brasseaux’s works are the most in-depth source to date for study of the life of one of the
principle conspirators in the 1768 revolt: Denis-Nicolas Foucault. Brasseaux’s contribution to
the first volume of the The Louisiana Purchase Bicentennial Series in Louisiana History, “Plus
ça change: Acte Second” briefly explores struggles for status between Foucault and the French
11

Alcée Fortier, A History of Louisiana Vol. II: The Spanish Domination and the Cession to the United States,
1769-1803, (New York: Manzi, Joyant & Co., 1904), 10.
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governor Charles Philippe Aubry, which Braseaux argues were contributing factors to Foucault’s
participation in the 1768 revolt. Much more detail is given on Foucault’s role before and during
the rebellion in Brasseaux’s Denis-Nicolas Foucault and the New Orleans Rebellion of 1768.
Shannon Lee Dawdy presents a nuanced look at the city of New Orleans under the
French colonial system in Building the Devil’s Empire: French Colonial New Orleans. It is
invaluable for understanding the city as it was inherited by the Spaniards. Her emphasis on how
the lax control of the French crown led to a alternate authority developing in New Orleans
amongst the city’s elite, and how the city drifted toward ever more violent methods of conflict
resolution reinforces notions of how dangerous Governor Ulloa’s reluctance to completely
establish Spanish authority upon arrival was. Building the Devil’s Empire also contains, as a
final chapter, an analysis of the revolt of 1768. Dawdy’s analysis places emphasis on the
enlightenment, a developed aversion to regulation on the part of the creole oligarchy and the
influence of “rogue agents” in the making of the revolution.12 Dawdy seems to show a slight
sympathy toward the French “martyrs”, and echoes sentiments more strongly voiced by Arthur
Preston Whitaker in The Spanish-American Frontier: 1783‑1795 that the Spanish regime was
doomed to fail in Louisiana due to the impossibility of projecting a strong authoritarian
monarchy across the Atlantic.
James E. Winston’s “The Cause and Results of the Revolution of 1768 in Louisiana”,
published in The Louisiana Historical Quarterly, (1932) presents a view on the revolt with more
emphasis on economic factors and the ambition of the members of the Superior Council coup.
The most in-depth study of the October rebellion remains John Preston Moore’s Revolt in
Louisiana: the Spanish occupation, 1766-1770. Moore’s balanced approach to French and
12

Shannon Lee Dawdy, Building the Devil’s Empire: French Colonial New Orleans, (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2008), 220.
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Spanish sources and careful scrutiny for bias produced an unbiased detailed recounting of the
conditions of the colony that contributed to the revolt, and the Spanish reaction to the revolt.
Moore’s account stands as one of the major sources for this thesis. Reinhart Kondert examines
the German settlers’ involvement in the revolt in “The German Involvement in the Rebellion of
1768”, published in Louisiana History (1985). Similarly the role of the Acadians is explored by R.
E. Chandler in “Ulloa and the Acadians”, Louisiana History (1980). Ulloa’s own account of the
revolt was translated by R. E. Chandler and presented with an introduction and annotations in
Louisiana History (1986).
Hilda S. Krousel’s biography of Governor Antonio de Ulloa y de la Torre-Guiral,
appropriately entitled Don Antonio De Ulloa: First Spanish Governor to Louisiana, was a useful
introduction to the governor, his achievements and aspects of his personality that both aided and
hindered his effectiveness in Louisiana. Krousel’s biography served both to update and expound
upon information presented by John Preston Moore, and Arthur P. Whitaker in their biographical
articles on Ulloa – presented in The Hispanic American Historical Review (1935), and Louisiana
History, (1967), respectively.
Similarly David Ker Texada’s Alejandro O'Reilly and the New Orleans Rebels serves as
an excellent resource for the restoration of Spanish rule and trial of the Superior Council
members who rebelled. Texada outlines O’Reilly’s overwhelming force as well as his cagey
nature and unwillingness to use that force when it was not necessary. Details of the trial and
colonial reorganization were also recorded in the letter O’Reilly sent to Count Arriaga, translated
by R. E. Chandler in , “O'Reilly and the Rebels: Report to Arriaga”, Louisiana History (1982).
Alejandro O’Reilly introduced Louisiana to the Spanish system of local governance, the
cabildo system. The history and significance of that institution is the subject of Gilbert C. Din
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and John E. Harkins’ New Orleans Cabildo: Colonial Louisiana's First City Government, 1769–
1803. Their treatment of the cabildo reveals the role the institution played in bringing the colony
closer to the Spanish legal and cultural systems through reform of government functions, legal
systems, economy, trade and the slave system. It serves as an excellent exploration of how those
changes impacted the colony and had a lasting effect on the development of institutions native to
Louisiana.
Din’s article “Carondelet, the Cabildo, and Slaves: Louisiana in 1795”, published in
Louisiana History (1997) examines the use of slave reform as a method of keeping the slave
population pacified, including disagreement over the same between Baron Carondelet and the
important planter members of the cabildo.
Race and the slave system in Spanish Louisiana is a focus of another of Din’s books:
Spaniards, Planters and Slaves: The Spanish regulation of Slavery in Louisiana, 1763-1803.
Spaniards, Planters and Slaves treats the divisions among white colonists over how to handle
slaves, with respect to the French system of harsh treatment and the Spanish system which was
relatively more lax. Among other things Din’s work is useful for its keen insights into the
interplay between the planter’s position of ultimate authority on the plantation and his position as
subordinate to colonial authority – particularly how those two positions occasionally conflicted.
It also treats the divisions among and between slaves and free people of color in Louisiana. In
this respect, and with regard to the Spanish attitudes and policies toward slavery, the work is
thought to be somewhat more nuanced than another recent treatment of slaves in Louisiana Gwendolyn Hall’s Africans in Colonial Louisiana: The Development of Afro-Creole Culture in
the Eighteenth Century. However Halls’s coverage of the Point Coupee rebellions (1793,1795) is
quite useful. Printed only in Spanish, Juan José Andreu Ocariz’ Movimientos rebeldes de los
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esclavos negros durante el dominio español en Luisiana is another well thought of, though
remarkably hard to find, source for information on rebellious slaves and maroonage in the
colony.
There are a couple of works that deal with rebellion and control directly, usually as it
applies to native or slave populations. Choice, Persuasion and Coercion: Social Control on
Spain’s North American Frontier, edited by Jesús F. de la Teja and Ross Frank, delivers a series
of essays which deal with various aspects of social control in the New World. The touchy
relationship between Spaniard and French Creoles is discussed, as are slave relations. A good
number of the essays deal with issues of controlling native tribes. For Native American relations
there are a number of other works available. Indians, Settlers, & Slaves in a Frontier Exchange
Economy: the Lower Mississippi Valley Before 1783, by Daniel H. Usner, Jr., is a valuable look
at cultural, social and economic exchange between groups often thought of in adversarial terms,
but mostly covers the years before 1768.
There are surprisingly few studies dedicated solely to the impact of the French
Revolution in colonial Louisiana, though the subject is quite frequently mentioned in histories of
Louisiana and the Spanish colonial efforts in America. This is particularly true regarding the
series of small revolts that occurred in New Orleans and the rural countryside of the colony. The
most complete single study to date remains Ernst Liljegren’s “Jacobinism in Spanish Louisana,
1792-1797”, published in The Louisiana Historical Quarterly, (1939). Carondelet’s
administration as a whole is the subject of Thomas Marc Fiehrer’s Ph.D. dissertation from
Tulane: "The Baron of Carondelet as Agent of Bourbon Reform: A Study of Spanish
Colonial Administration in the Years of the French Revolution," (1977).
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A major exception to this lack of dedicated coverage would be the Point Coupee slave
revolt which receives periodic attention. In addition to the following books below, which treat
the slave revolt in more depth, an updated interpretation of Carondelet’s relationship to the revolt
can be found in Gilbert C. Din’s “Carondelet, the Cabildo, and Slaves: Louisiana in 1795”,
published in Louisiana History: (1997).
The impact of the Haitian revolution on African slaves is the subject of Revolution,
Romanticism, and the Afro-Creole Protest Tradition in Louisiana 1718-1868, by Caryn Cossé
Bell. The first few chapters deal with the French and Spanish regimes in Louisiana, though the
work has been criticized for over emphasizing the role that religion played in regulating slave
masters as well as the role of free people of color in New Orleans as a supporting element of the
Spanish administrations. A far broader treatment of the impact of the Haitian revolt on slaves in
America, is David Barry Gaspar and David Patrick Geggus’ A Turbulent Time: The French
Revolution and the Greater Caribbean. The treatment Louisiana receives highlights the split
nature of both white and slave society, and the two-way nature of (actual and rumored) slave
reform as influence on slave revolt, as well as the impact slave revolts had on slave reform in the
colony.
In Gwendolyn Midlo Hall’s Africans in Colonial Louisiana: The Development of AfroCreole Culture in the Eighteenth Century, she places a great deal of influence on the French
Revolution as a contributing factor in slave revolts. Hall goes so far as to place the 1795 slave
revolt as a vanguard action for the invasion of Spanish Louisiana. She also asserts that there
were abolitionist Spanish soldiers who were sympathetic to the African slaves.13 Gilbert C. Din,
in Spaniards, Planters and Slaves: The Spanish regulation of Slavery in Louisiana, 1763-1803,
13
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challenges Hall’s conclusions on these points. Din argues that there is little evidence to support
either the slave revolts as part of a French invasion, or the notion that there was much of an
abolitionist movement in Louisiana at the time.14
The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the
Revolutionary Atlantic, by Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, displays the radicalizing and
liberalizing influence found in many of the circumstances that accompanied colonial life. The
distance from European power centers allowed “discreetly free” trade and encouraged cultural
exchange to the detriment of proto-national hegemony. The rise of capitalism disrupted
traditional social structures, and created an economic discontent which helped fuel the push for
natural rights associated with the Enlightenment. Linebaugh and Rediker discuss in detail how
trade routes acted as avenues for the dissemination of revolutionary sentiment – thus allowing a
traceable “vector” for the spread of revolutionary zeal from France and Haiti.
Colonial Louisiana was almost never profitable for the major powers that she served.
The economics of the colony under the Spaniards, as well as the role that economics played in
the colonial development under the French and Spanish is covered to great depth, and with great
sensitivity in John G. Clark’s New Orleans, 1718-1812: An Economic History. Noted Louisiana
historian Jack D. L. Holmes covers some of the same ground in his study of the colonial
economy during the Spanish period “Some Economic Problems of Spanish Governors of
Louisiana” published in The Hispanic American Historical Review, (1962). Ralph Lee
Woodward, Jr. takes another approach to the colonial economy with his more recent look in
“Spanish Commercial Policy in Louisiana, 1763-1803” published in Louisiana History (2003).

14

Gilbert C. Din, Spaniards, Planters and Slaves: The Spanish Regulation of Slavery in Louisiana, 1763-1803,
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1999), 175-176.

17

The two most recent movements to shape the study of Spanish colonial Louisiana are
borderlands studies and Atlantic studies. A series of impressive works have come out of both
areas of study recently, which improve upon the early models of understanding the relationship
between Spain, Britain and US in America. The borderland studies should be understood in part
as reactions to frontier studies that came before them. Arthur Preston Whitaker’s early work
dealing with the border, The Spanish-American Frontier, 1783‑1795: The Westward Movement
and the Spanish Retreat in the Mississippi Valley, has an unapologetically American-“Frontier
Thesis”-inspired view of the relationship between Spain and America across the shared border.
To Whitaker the Spanish model of colonialism was doomed, as the British model had been for
the thirteen colonies. With John Francis Bannon’s The Spanish Borderlands Frontier 1523-1821
the nature of the relationship between Spain and the US is presented very differently. Bannon
deals with the Spanish advance across America in terms of malleable and porous borders, open
to cultural exchange and adaptation – not hard frontiers which pitted closed “state-systems” in
competition for space. More recent treatments of the same subject include David Weber’s work,
The Spanish Frontier in North America. Weber uses the idea of frontier exchange to explore the
myriad of views and influences that shaped the Spanish colonial holdings in North America, and
which continue to influence America in those regions. Most recently, J. C. A. Stagg’s
Borderlines in Borderlands: James Madison and the Spanish-American Frontier, 1766-1821
takes a more diplomatically and politically informed approach to the borderlands. Stagg reveals
how policy at national and local levels played a role in the eventual US ascendancy over Spain in
North America.
The Atlantic Studies movement is important to re-contextualizing the American
experience as one wholly related to events in Europe and the Caribbean. There are a number of
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great recent works that have come out of the Atlantic movement recently. J. H. Elliott just
released a new synthesis text on the competition between the Spanish and English empires in the
New World. Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830 is a
wonderful overview of the tensions, contrasts and similarities between the two Atlantic super
powers of the eighteenth-century that somewhat blurs the lines between borderland history and
Atlantic history. Andrew McMichael’s Atlantic Loyalties: Americans in Spanish West Florida,
1785-1810, outlines exactly the kind of trans-Atlantic trade and influence that helped shape
reality in the Spanish American colonies. The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves,
Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic, by Peter Linebaugh and
Marcus Rediker, explores merchant routes as avenues for cultural exchange and the spread of
revolutionary sentiment across the Atlantic.
Theory, and modeling borrowed from the discipline of political science played an
important role in the creation of this thesis. A few texts stand out as particularly useful. Claude
E. Welch Jr.’s Anatomy of a Rebellion was an incredible resource for this thesis and informs both
the questions it asks and to a lesser degree its structure. Welch’s methodology and conclusions
will be examined in chapter one. The works of Charles Tilly, particularly The Politics of
Collective Violence, and The Dynamics of Contention, co-written with Doug McAdam and
Sidney Tarrow, help to define political science terminology and present both abstract theories of
violence and classification systems useful for categorizing societies and societal change. George
Rudé’s Ideology and Popular Protest helped delineate the role and place of ideology in
rebellion. Guy Fourquin’s The Anatomy of Popular Rebellion in the Middle Ages provided a
series of medieval examples of rebellion, useful for seeking out long established European trends
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in the Louisiana revolts. The author of this thesis found Michael Mollat and Philippe Wolff’s
The Popular Revolutions of the Late Middle Ages to be useful for much the same reasons.
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CHAPTER I
ULLOA AND THE LOSS OF SPANISH CONTROL
In late October of 1768, a small cabal of prominent Louisianans led a coup against the
incumbent government and ousted the Spanish governor, Antonio de Ulloa y de la Torre-Guiral.
These men, many of whom were members of the Superior Council, which acted as the main
legislative and administrative body in the colony, held positions of influence in the
Spanish/French administration of the colony – though with time, and the advancement of
Spanish interest in the colony that influence was likely to diminish. The conspirators used their
high position in colonial society to harness popular discontent with the Spanish regime and rally
a combined group of French, Creole, Acadian and German militias to storm the colonial capital
of New Orleans. The coup was bloodless, and Governor Ulloa fled New Orleans within three
days of the gathering. The Rebels’ goal was to then hold the colony under the administration of
the Superior Council alone, until such a time as they could convince his most Christian Majesty,
King Louis XV of France, to take control of the colony. The methods the rebels used as well as
the extent and underlying reasons for popular support of this rebellion present recurring themes,
important throughout the Spanish experience in the Louisiana colony.
Far from the centers of European power and control, colonial Louisiana, from its
inception under French rule, proved itself a troublesome and “disorderly” place – particularly the
city of New Orleans.15 The French government lacked a strong presence in the colony, due in
large part to geographic factors such as distance, porous borders, and difficult travel. This lack
of control (and support) led to a large amount of independence for French Louisianans.16 When
15
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challenged by metropolitan authority, that independence would often lead the French settlers to
rebellious action. Often rebellion manifested itself as smuggling, however occasionally it did
manifest as conflict. Such was the case in 1760, when French commissaire-ordonnateur (the
official in charge of finances in the colony) Vincent de Rochemore took retribution on Governor
Louis Billouart de Kerlerec for the reform minded Governor’s having blocked a profiteering
scam Rochemore was involved with. Rochemere hampered Kerlerec by refusing the Governor
needed funds (for paying soldiers, among other things), and refusing to follow the Governors’
orders regarding price fixing – thus sowing discontent and casting dispersion on the Governor’s
effectiveness and authority.17 Rochemore also accused Kerlerec of “violations of the king’s
orders”, by permitting smuggling, – a charge which led to a formal investigation of the Governor
(which eventually found him innocent).18
Likewise, during the rebellion of 1768, the geography, and geographic marginality, of
Louisiana played a definite role in the ability of the rebel faction to organize without threat of
discovery, and in forming their sense of collective self-ascription. The geography also
negatively impacted Governor Ulloa’s ability to maintain control. The land of lower Louisiana
was swampy, crossed with bayous, and could be difficult to traverse, lending slightly remote
settlements an increased isolation and autonomy.19 The Mississippi river and its tributaries
flowed through the colony, providing conduits of rapid transport down-river. However transport
17
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upriver was considerably slower and the center of Spanish control was in the southern tip of the
colony. Up or down river, the trip was fraught with danger from eddies, snags, submerged trees,
and sand bars.20 Furthermore the relative size of the area he had to maintain was itself a problem.
Ulloa simply did not have enough men to adequately project his influence too far from his
location: be that New Orleans or the fort at Balize. Governor Ulloa planned a defensive fort on
an island, near Balize, at the mouth of the Mississippi river and at times he grew engrossed with
the fort’s planning (as well as scientific experiments that he conducted there).21
The geographic marginality of the Louisiana colony played a part in the Spanish regime’s
susceptibility to revolt. It should be noted however, that the members of the 1768 conspiracy
met near New Orleans, either at the home of Denis-Nicolas Foucault, the French Commissaireordonnateur and one of the principal plotters, or the house of Balthazar Masan, a retired captain
of the French infantry.22 Upon occasion they met outside the city, but nearby, at the residence of
Foucault’s neighbor, friend, and, for a time after the death of her husband the Chevalier JeanBaptiste de Pradel, his romantic interest, Mme. Alexandrine de Pradel.23 From these locations
the rebels were certainly near enough to provide influence and affect change in the behaviors of
the citizenry of New Orleans, which means that they were also near enough that they could not
rely upon distance for their safety. They could rely on secrecy, which the cabal maintained until
days before they put the plot into action.
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The ease of access that Ulloa should have had to the major conspirators should not
overshadow the role geographic marginality played as a precondition for the rebellion of 1768.
Within the colony, the relative isolation of the German Coast and Acadian settlements reinforced
their independence and self-ascription. Indeed the distance at which Ulloa wished to settle
Acadians from their “relations” at Point Coupee was a continuing source of friction between the
Acadians and the Spanish regime.24 Such distance kept them from forming large communal ties.
Governor Ulloa was conscious of this, and Carl A. Brasseaux suggests in The Founding of New
Acadia: The Beginnings of Acadian Life in Louisiana, 1765-1803 that Ulloa wished to settle the
Acadians at Natchez to prevent the formation of a large Francophile power bloc so close to the
administrative center at New Orleans as well as for the defense they would provide against the
British and native tribes.25
Ulloa's opponents used another distance against him. Ulloa's seeming retreat to Balize
was used to geographically inform and reinforce the already present perception of Spanish
Castillian "snobbery".26 The plotters insinuated that Ulloa felt himself too good to mix with the
French Creoles, and so had removed himself from their presence.
Distance between settlements and terrain that impeded travel were not the only elements
of the Louisiana geography contributing to the colony’s geographic marginality. The wilderness
of the colony was also dangerous. Violent weather in the late summer could be devastating to
crops, buildings, and colonists alike. Disease outbreaks, particularly yellow fever, threatened the
colonists yearly, and occasionally acted to prohibit travel and the visitation of relatives or
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friends.27 Colonists also frequently felt themselves at risk of attack by wild animals, (at times)
British raiders, or native tribes. This threat of attack constituted a much larger and seemingly real
threat to settlers living too far apart to rely on each other for aid. This self reliance, a necessity
of isolation, contributed to the development of an independent spirit and indifference to Spanish
authority.
Louisiana was a borderland, and suffered the limitations on authority normally associated
with them. A number of factors contributed to this border-land status. The British in West
Florida constituted a national border with all of the legal vagaries and governmental niceties that
one entailed. Fear of British involvement did somewhat limit Ulloa’s range of action when
dealing with smugglers, many of which were British. On the other hand, the fear that his
subjects might desert to the British forts across the Mississippi river was one of the reasons Ulloa
was relatively reluctant to use force to establish his authority. Throughout 1766 and 1768
Governor Ulloa settled Acadian newcomers in strategic military locations to form a counter to
the threat of possible British encroachment.28 That decision was wildly unpopular to the
Acadians, who wished to settle near earlier Acadian settlements on the Acadian coast, Attakapas
and Opelousas. The New Orleans French were quick to play on that discontent and spread
rumors of Governor Ulloa’s cruelty and barbarity.29 These rumors, such as Governor Ulloa’s
intending to sell the Acadians into slavery, undermined the loyalty that Ulloa may have
otherwise developed through his relatively generous support of the Acadian settlers by linking
Spanish rule with unreasoning despotism. Ulloa’s inability to enforce the settlement of Acadians
into strategic positions provided a display of weakened strength that threatened his authority.
27
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The Acadians were also less than pleased with the prospect of sharing borders with
Spain’s other neighbors: tribes of Native Americans including the Natchez, Houma, Creek,
Choctaw, Caddo, Osage, Tensas and Chickasaw.30 The Acadians and Native tribes had a
troubled relationship from the start. The Natives were fearful that they were going to be
displaced by the new settlers both in terms of territory, and as allies of the Spaniards. For their
part, the Acadians Ulloa settled near the border feared that the Natives, encouraged by the
British, would engage in raids on their farms and settlements.31 The Acadian settlements were
far enough from Spanish forts that they had little hope of finding refuge there in the face of such
an attack.
The Acadians were not the only ones fearful of native raiding sorties. Governor Ulloa
was convinced of the need to continue gift giving to the local native tribes to prevent them from
allying with the British, though he wished to limit the drain such gifts placed on the colony’s
treasury by limiting gift giving to prescribed special occasions.32 These gifts were an expensive
drain on colonial resources that could have been used to shore up food supplies or assuage the
hardships of the government or colonists in a myriad of other ways. Occasionally Ulloa lost
more than money. Some settlers would periodically “go native”, and run off to spend time with
local tribes. Even if those colonists returned, they often did so with less appreciation for colonial
authority and community norms. In this way the borderlands shared with the native tribes acted
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as both an economic depressor, cultural dilutant and cause of anxiety. All three of these sources
of discontent played a role in colonial restlessness.
However, the most important border to consider did not lie on any map. The dual
Spanish/French government presented a kind of internal borderland, especially in the colonial
hinterlands beyond New Orleans. The confusion of law, obligation, and loyalty that this created
in the citizenry is a constantly recurring theme in many histories of this period and one of the
leading contributing factors to the revolt. Due in large part to the confusion generated by a
government that had in effect two administrative heads, the citizens of Louisiana were not sure if
the Spanish government had really taken control, and, if it had, whether the Spaniards would
retain control for a long period of time.33 The reluctance Ulloa showed in replacing the French
Superior Council with a Spanish administrative body further confused the issue, and gave the
French creoles cause to hope for a return to French control.
Perhaps the key concern for many of the French subjects of Spanish Louisiana was the
colony’s economy. Uncertainty in the new Spanish government and the tenacity with which
some French creoles held on to the belief that France would retrocede the colony, led many
French creoles to doubt the Spanish economic system and the colony’s place in it.34 This doubt
compounded the fear many French creoles held that the new Spanish government would not be
able to, or willing to, honor their depreciated paper currency.35 The net effect was that the
citizens retained their attachments to France and the French system, while at the same time the
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confusion of law allowed for a justification of illegal or quasi-legal activities. As will be seen,
this is particularly true for violation of unpopular trade restrictions that were eventually
introduced by Ulloa’s new regime in an effort to stabilize the colonial economy, and bring her
more fully into the Spanish mercantile system.36 Perhaps if Ulloa had been more direct,
ostentatious, and immediate with displays of Spanish control, instead of relying on the former
French governor Aubry’s aid, there would have been less “grey area” which allowed the
rebellious subjects “room” to maneuver.
But geographic marginality must not be thought of solely in “intra-colony” terms. In the
larger context, the distance of Louisiana from Spain and, perhaps even more importantly, Spain's
closer and more established colonial holdings played a huge role not only in Ulloa's inability to
support the colony, but also in his inability to control her. The distance from New Orleans to
Havana is nearly 700 miles, which meant that the flow of information and support both in terms
of money and military assistance from Spain and Mexico (typically through Cuba) was slow and
subject to dangerous storms. The difficulty and risk involved in the long sea voyage had a
chilling effect on Spanish support of the colony. It was rendered less frequently than it perhaps
could have been. Specie and money were slow to travel to the colony, leading to an increased
feeling of marginality and weak Spanish authority; as well as allowing the already dismal
economic situation to further decline into outright depression and inflation. Frequently such
support arrived much later than anticipated, leading Ulloa to begin asking for money with which
to build a “buffer” against continued late arrivals.37 It was in part the distance of the colony and
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danger in sailing to her that delayed the deployment of the Fixed Louisiana Battalion of troops
for over two years thereby weakening the perceived strength of Spanish rule in French creole
eyes.
Changes in the social order and economy constitute an important component of the
setting for rebellion. The arrival of Ulloa heralded the possibility of dangerous changes for many
of the French creoles. On the economic front, established colonists were fearful that the
devalued currency they held would not be honored by the Spaniards at face value. Ulloa
intended to allow the paper currency to be redeemed at a rate of sixty-five percent of its face
value. This was a better rate than the colonists had any right to expect. The value of the notes
were worth about twenty-five percent of par, and ultimately the rate that Ulloa offered was a
better rate than the sixty percent that later Governor O’Reilly eventually established. However
many colonists, particularly those who had purchased notes on speculation that their value would
increase, felt cheated by the rate and chose not to redeem.38 By failing to resolve the glut of
devalued paper currency, Ulloa allowed the colony to remain mired in an economic depression.
What little specie entered the colony hemorrhaged outward to satisfy debts to outsiders who were
loathe to accept the nearly worthless paper notes.39 This depressed economy exacerbated other
social problems, as well as created quite a bit of discontent in and of itself. Another source of
this exacerbation, particularly among the “better sort” in the colony, was the threat of social
displacement by the Spaniards as well as the potential and real imposition of Spanish cultural
norms to replace those of the French.

38

Clark, New Orleans 1718-1812, 160-161; Holmes, “Some Economic Problems”, 523.

39

Ulloa, “Ulloa to Buccareli, February 2, 1768, No. 46”, Despatches, 52-53. In this letter Ulloa calls for more
specie to be shipped to the colony for, among other things, but listed first the payment of debts to foreign merchants.

29

Under the French regime, the merchants of New Orleans developed an alternate economy
to the rigid mercantile system. This alternate economy relied on smuggling and internal trade.40
The alternate economy also relied on (and in turn fueled) the relative independence that
Louisianans enjoyed. The colony relied increasingly on such smuggling since the period
shortly before the Seven Years War (1756-1763), after British privateers inflicted severe losses
on the French merchant marine in 1755. England’s decisive naval victory over France cut the
colony off from French supply and all but ensured that New Orleans would not be able to receive
necessary goods without resorting to illicit imports – often from British ships.41 In time such
smuggling became so ingrained in the colonial system of French Louisiana that it is now hard to
draw concrete distinctions between what was legal and illegal trade at the time.42 As the reality
of Spanish control began to “sink in”, many colonists also feared that Spain would fold
Louisiana into Spain’s established mercantile system, a move which would potentially damage
Louisiana trade by cutting off traditional trade partners- the English, the French and the French
Caribbean Islands. With regard to imports, the English in particular were valuable trade partners
for the colony, and supplied many colonial staples, the most important of which was flour.
During the period of French rule, the merchants of New Orleans enjoyed trade with the
American British colonies, the French island colonies and even the Spanish holdings in the
Caribbean and South America. The colony never prospered tremendously from the trade. It was
the case, as John G. Clark said that “Silver flowed through New Orleans, not to New Orleans.”43
However that is not to say that the trade was not valued; one could go so far as to say that
40
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external trade was necessary to the existence of the Louisiana colony. New Orleans was a
commercial center into which goods and trade flowed - not only locally, but along the rivers and
native trails through the Mississippi valley, the Caribbean and Gulf Coast colonies, from Africa
and Europe.44 This commercial shipping provided access to necessary goods and materials, as
well as provided a livelihood for a merchant “class” of some power.
Governor Ulloa’s attempts to eliminate, or at least reduce, smuggling brought trepidation
to many local traders and merchants who relied on smugglers to receive and ship goods,
including the British flour which was nearly always in short supply.45 In the 1763 Treaty of
Paris, which ended the Seven Years War (French and Indian War), the British won navigation
rights to the Mississippi river; however, they did not have rights to make landing on or utilize
either bank of the river in Spanish territory. Traditionally a “blind eye” was turned to British
trade, as the goods offered were necessary to the success of the colony and generally unavailable
from other sources. By attempting to restrict that trade, and failing, Ulloa not only was seen as
responsible for limiting the colonists’ access to necessary, and customary goods, he was shown
to be incapable of enforcing the law – again revealing the limits of his authority.46 The
importance of British trade increased dramatically in 1765 alongside the arrival of the
Acadians.47 The need for food and other staples in short supply spiked just prior to the arrival of
Governor Ulloa - at a moment when the colony was undergoing a period of significant change.48
The shortages greatly aggravated the stresses produced by the change of colonial governments.
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Governor Ulloa recognized the role that supply shortages and economic depression played in the
willingness of “these people [to] start insurrections, even without any cause, as it has happened
many times before.”49 But the colony drained resources faster than Spain would (or perhaps
even could) supply them.
In a letter to Spanish Foreign Minister Pablo Jerónimo de Grimaldi y Pallavicini, Marquis
de Grimaldi, dated October 10, 1768, Governor Ulloa complained of British ships violating the
terms of the 1763 Treaty of Paris by utilizing the Mississippi river banks. In this letter Ulloa
outlined his need to have had the Volante fire on British ships bringing “flour, meat, and other
provisions for this city [New Orleans]”, which had tied up “on the opposite bank without first
presenting permission in writing” from him.50 Contrary to popular fears, Ulloa did not object to
the import of supplies that were direly needed out of malice or indifference. In fact Ulloa
complained frequently to his immediate superior, the Spanish Captain General of Cuba, Senõr
Don Antonio Buccareli, of the impoverished conditions in the colony, and pleaded for money
with which to rejuvenate the economy and improve the colonial infrastructure.51 Ulloa wished
to inspect foreign vessels before granting them permission to dock so that he would be able to
properly assess and collect taxes on imports, and make certain that the ships were not harboring
deserters. Nonetheless Ulloa’s slight restriction on British trade, trade which included valuable
foodstuffs, angered and worried the merchants of New Orleans who both needed the food, and
wished to keep prices as low as possible.
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It is hard to overestimate the importance of such British trade and merchants to New
Orleans, and the colony as a whole. Louisianans consumed imported British foods like flour and
pork, which supplemented their own home grown edibles. These British imports also allowed
planters and merchants to build a surplus of food with which to feed slaves and thus increase the
means of production on the plantations. Imported foodstuffs were also an important component
of the colonial export economy. Spanish merchants resold imported British food as an export to
Spanish gulf colonies like Havana, and other Atlantic and Caribbean coastal colonies. As a trade
good, the exported food provided a means of communication and “brought with them credit,
shipping, and contacts with New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore.”52
The British merchants did not limit their contribution to the economy of Louisiana to just
food and staple goods. British merchants also brought the first large shipments of slaves to New
Orleans since 1743. In doing so they were incredibly important to the plantations which relied
on that slave labor.53
John G. Clark argues that for these reasons, in the early years of the Spanish reign, this
British trade made England far more important than France or even Spain to the growth and
stability of the colony.54 This made the restriction (much less rejection) of British trade a
dangerous and almost impossible position for Governor Ulloa to maintain. Governor Ulloa was
aware of this, and proceeded with caution and concern over the commercial well-being of his
subjects as much as he could. While cognizant of corruption and disapproving of smuggling,
Ulloa moved slowly to reform. But ultimately, Louisiana was a Spanish colony, and from the
Spanish perspective needed to pay its way. The colony would contribute to the wealth of the
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Spanish empire by entering more fully into the mercantile system. Given the importance of nonSpanish trade to the colony, it is no surprise that citizens, particularly merchants and planters,
were greatly concerned and discontented over what many believed to be inevitable and harmful
Spanish trade restrictions.
These economic concerns came to a head over the adoption of the Royal Decree of
March 23, 1768, which while greatly liberalizing trade, also brought Louisiana more completely
“in line” with the economic system of the Spaniards.55 The decree imposed seventeen
regulations on trade in Louisiana. As they are important to understanding the nature of the
complaint that the citizens had against the Spanish government, they will be summarized
individually here. The first of these regulations limited trade in the colony to nine Spanish ports:
Cadiz, Sevilla, Alicante, Cartagena, Málaga, Barcelona, Santander, Coruña, and Gijón (I).
Certain taxes and duties were not levied on ships, however the shipping of foreign wine was
prohibited (II). Ships must be of Spanish construction and belong to Spaniards as well as have a
crew consisting two-thirds of Spaniards, which Ulloa noticed caused considerable consternation
even after he declared the citizens of Louisiana to be naturalized Spanish citizens, thus
qualifying them (III).56 Ships sailing to Louisiana had to sail directly from the approved ports
above to Louisiana with no prior stops in America or the adjacent islands, unless forced to stop
due to weather or other uncontrollable circumstance (IV). The administrators of the
customhouses were to establish a record of items carried to Louisiana and their values (V). No
duty was to be collected on goods shipped to Louisiana, be they of foreign or Spanish origin
(VI). Goods shipped from the above mentioned ports must have been shipped into them, and
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thus had their duties paid (VII). Ship captains must keep sealed registers of goods loaded for
shipment to Louisiana, and put forth a bond of ten percent of their value that they would ship the
recorded goods to the colony (VIII). If by accident a captain should need to arrive at another
port en route to Louisiana, he might sell his goods there if necessary, provided he showed proof
that he was forced to that port. He would forfeit the bond on his goods to fulfill export duties
(IX). Receipts must be tendered to the customhouse at departure, that the value of the bond
might be cancelled (X). Upon arrival to Louisiana, the captain must present the ship’s register to
the minister of the royal treasury; who would then permit unloading of goods without import
duty, or any other charge save anchorage in the river or other municipal duty (XI). After
unloading cargo, the minister of the treasury would present the captain with a receipt of goods
(XII). Goods taken on in Louisiana must originate from Louisiana (XIII). A list of goods and
money taken on in Louisiana must be presented to the minister of the royal treasury (XIV). That
same list must be presented to the customhouse of his next port in order that his bond for these
goods might be cancelled (XV). Goods taken from Louisiana must pay the four percent import
duty (XVI). And finally, if the goods shipped from Louisiana to the approved ports of Spain
could not be sold at those ports, the captain might then take them freely to another country for
sale without export duties (XVII).57
Although through setting relatively minor taxation and import fees, and the increase of
available Spanish ports, the Royal Decree of March 23, 1768 greatly improved the colony’s legal
trade position, it was seen as repressive and a signal that the colony was subject to Spanish
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“tyranny”.58 So much so, that the Superior Council cited fear of integration into the Spanish
mercantile system as one of their primary concerns and a major cause of their actions to remove
the Spanish authority during the coup of October 28th, 1768. New Orleans relied on relatively
free trade as its “greatest economic advantage”, and many merchants feared ruin would follow
entry into the restrictive Spanish mercantile system.59 Nicolas-Chauvin Lafrénière, one of the
principal leaders of the rebellion, couched his speech to the Superior Council in the terms of
bringing to the (ostensibly French) citizens a “return of ancient liberties and rights”, specifically
with regard to freedom of trade with traditional trade partners, which had been abrogated by the
Spaniards.60 The text of the Superior Council’s justification of the revolt leaves little doubt that
economics were a major factor.
The council justified the rebellion with a list of concerns over the new regulations and
infringements that they felt they had to redress. Many of these concerns relate directly to the
constraints on trade outlined in the Royal Decree of March 23, 1768. The council listed as the
first of the issues they wished to bring before French court the restoration of the commercial
liberties enjoyed by the colony since the cession without the introduction of “innovations” which
might “interrupt their course and disturb the security of the citizens.”61 The second request the
council made was that passports be granted to captains travelling to France or America. The
council requested that all ships sailing from any port in France or America be given free
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entrance, regardless of whether or not they sailed directly into the colony, or came from another
port. The fourth request was that freedom of trade be extended to all nations “under the
government of his most Christian Majesty.”62 These requests show that the Superior Council,
and ostensibly the more influential colonists (merchants and large planters) who would have
been able to have made their opinions felt by the council, desired a return to the less restrictive
“laissez-faire” trade, as it was carried out under the last years of the French regime. The
increased discontent caused by the removal of this free trade was a motivating factor in the
decision made to move toward rebellion.
The fifth point of the Superior Council’s Decree was a general airing of grievances
against Governor Ulloa. The overall theme to these grievances is that Governor Ulloa acted
without legitimate authority in the colony. In the eyes of the Superior Council, the last legitimate
laws were those in place under French Governor Jean-Jacques Blaise D’Abbadie.63 With regard
to trade, the Superior Council specifically charged that Ulloa, “of his own accord, by his own
private authority, insisted upon captains being detained with their ships in the port without any
cause”.64 Those charges generally support the theory that confusion over the legitimacy of
Spanish rule played a large role in the ideology of the revolt.
The sixth and final request made by the council was that all Spanish officials and soldiers
be ordered to quit their posts and leave the colony, and that copies of the decree to that effect be
printed and disbursed to the various posts of the colony.65
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There were three large groups of colonists that comprised the bulk of the rioters who
participated in the rebellion, and provided the force which convinced Governors Ulloa and
Aubry that it was not safe for Ulloa to remain: French creoles from New Orleans, colonists from
the German Coast and disgruntled Acadian immigrants. The members of these groups had
legitimate cause for discontent with the Spanish regime, however as will be seen, without the
manipulation of members of the conspiracy the Germans and Acadians would probably not have
marched on New Orleans. The interests of those communities and how they were manipulated
into action by members of the conspiracy are important points to consider when examining the
rebellion. Recurring themes of discontent, both those which occurred “organically” and those
manufactured by agents of the conspiracy, need to be identified should they be useful in
revealing a correlation, or continuity of perceived discontent tying the 1768 rebellion with the
discontent of the 1790’s.
Although the controls of the Spanish commercial system would ultimately benefit the
German Coast residents, the trade restrictions imposed by Governor Ulloa also had an immediate
negative impact on the perceived financial security of the Louisianans of the German Coast. The
German Coast settlers had come to count on the export of indigo, tobacco, cotton and cypress
timber to French, English and Spanish holdings.66 By restricting trade to select Spanish ports,
the decree of March 23, 1768 made much of this established German coastal trade illegal. This
gave the Louisianans of the German Coast cause to fear the loss of trade that supplemented their
(in some cases subsistence) farming. As Commandant of the German Coast, Charles Frederick
D’Arensbourg would have been receptive to the complaints and financial interests of those
settlers. It would have been a matter of honor and prestige for those under him to prosper. No
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doubt his personal standing and financial well being would have also been impacted by the new
trade regulation and restrictions that Ulloa implemented.
Commandant D’Arensbourg, had other personal reasons for fearing the commercial
policies of the Spaniards. D’Arensbourg was a close family friend of the Attorney General,
Nicolas Chauvin de Lafrénière, and grandfather of Lafrénière’s wife. Lafrénière’s son-in-law,
Jean-Baptiste Noyen, had been making rumblings that his dissatisfaction with the Spanish
economic policies was so great that he was selling his estate and “moving with his family and
slaves to Cayenne (French Guiana).” In fact, Noyen had begun to make preparations to do just
that.67 D’Arensbourg was worried that the departure of the Attorney General’s son-in-law would
cause a great deal of tumult in his own family and personal dealings.68 This belief led
D’Arensbourg to support the rebel cause with little hesitation, lending the rebels an influential
presence on the German Coast.
D’Arensbourg’s support was important to what short term success the rebellion enjoyed.
D’Arensbourg gave the order allowing Captain Josephe Villeré, head of the German Coast
militia of as many as 400 men to march on New Orleans with some pretense of legitimacy.69
D’Arensbourg also played a key role in preventing Ulloa from mollifying German Coast
discontent. On October 25th, 1768 Governor Ulloa, after having learned of the mounting
dissention amongst the German coast settlers, sent Antoine Gilbert de St. Maxent to the German
Coast with fifteen hundred pesos with which to pay D’Arensbourg for grain which had been
appropriated to feed a recent wave of Acadian immigrants, and by doing so pacify the German
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farmers and merchants. Commandant D’Arensbourg, upon meeting with St. Maxent, not only
refused to accept payment for the grain but also refused to accept any apology or “gesture of
good will from the Spanish authorities.”70
D’Arensbourg then had Villeré arrest St. Maxent, either at D’Arensbourg’s home or on
the route back, and hold him at the Cantrelle Plantation. Villeré then took the money sent with
St. Maxent for the German goods and dispersed most of it himself through the German Coast
settlement.71 By taking this decisive step against the interests of Governor Ulloa, D’Arensbourg,
drove the discontent and financial uncertainty of the German Coast settlers to the point where
they were willing to enter into collective political action. D’Aresnbourg not only robbed Ulloa
of a method to reconcile himself with the German Coast; he later lent his good name and the
esteem that he had built as Commandant and judge to the settlers of the area to the rebellious
faction and in doing so was instrumental in the decision of the German Coast Militia to march on
New Orleans.
On October, 28th 1768, around four hundred members of the German Coast militia joined
forces with a larger force comprised of some six hundred of the French and other militias at the
house of François Chauvin de Lery.72 There, plied with wine and armed with muskets, they
reassured each other of the justness of their cause and the courage they possessed. The total
force of the rebels measured around a thousand men. There were only one hundred Spanish and
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loyal French guards in the city to check them.73 At ten to one odds, it must have seemed that the
Spanish forces would not have stood long against the gathered militias had the potentially riotous
mobs turned violent. But, aside from a few street patrols and the spiking of the New Orleans
cannons (on the previous evening), that first night the primary aim of the militias seemed to be
that of arming themselves and drinking “the good wine of Bordeaux”.74 For the conspirators the
presence of a large element of popular support was all that was necessary at the moment. Such a
sufficient display of potential force was enough to roust the Spanish presence before
reinforcements could be sent for from Havana.
The next morning the combined militias received orders to marshal near Governor
Ulloa’s residence. That first night was important to the rebels as it served to build camaraderie
and shared ascription as enemies of the Spanish regime. It allowed a symbolic connection to
develop in the disparate groups of colonists, prompted by the shared experience of dissatisfaction
with Ulloa; fear of the coming Spanish mercantile system; longing for the laissez-faire of the
French government; and finally, one can imagine, heady talk bolstered by wine and a sense of
courage stemming from the company of armed like-minded men. That first night at the home of
François Chauvin de Lery was a bonding experience that channeled the various economic and
social interests of Acadians, Germans and French of New Orleans to a desire to fulfill the goal of
the conspirators. It was perhaps the moment that allowed distinct situations of unrest and
discontent to ferment together into a single instance of collective political action.
The relative non-violence of the gathering is important to understanding the character of
the revolt. At this stage is seems more like a demonstration of dissatisfaction and concern;
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almost something more akin to a workers’ strike than a rebellion. There must have been either
exemplary control on the part of the mob “leaders”, or a general lack of will to do violence on
the part of the mob. This lack of violence speaks to the ends that the rebels wished to attain.
The rebels wanted a rejection of the “innovations” of Spanish regime in favor of a return to the
traditional ways of the French. Their rejection was, to a degree, orderly. That orderliness
suggests that (with the possible exception of Pierre Marquis – who favored the formation of an
independent republic) the rebels wanted more of a reformation than a revolution - a return to
comfortable French tradition, rather than any radical or revolutionary change in governmental
systems.75 To a degree the relative quietness of the mob speaks to the level of manipulation that
the cabal leaders held over them. This was not a mob twisted to murderous outrage over the
Spanish rule. Members most certainly held strong feelings – many worried about Spanish trade
restrictions or motivated by ethnic tension - but their primary motivation was the collection of
debt and redemption of paper currency. It took the charismatic leaders of the conspiracy to turn
those economic desires into rebellion.
The principal conspirators, as listed by Charles Gayarré, were: “[Nicholas Chauvin de ]
Lafrénière, the king's Attorney-General;[Denis-Nicolas] Foucault, the Intendant Commissary;
[Balthazar de] Masan [alternately Mason], a retired captain of infantry, a wealthy planter, and a
knight of St. Louis; [Pierre] Marquis, a captain in the Swiss troops enlisted in the service of
France; [Jean Baptiste de] Noyan, a retired captain of cavalry; and Bienville Noyan, a lieutenant
in the navy, both the nephews of Jean-Baptiste Le Moyne de Bienville, the founder and a
repeated governor, of the colony; [Julien Jerome] Doucet, a distinguished lawyer; Jean and
Joseph Milhet; [Pierre] Caresse; [Joseph] Petit; and [Pierre] Poupet, who were among the
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principal merchants; [Pierre] Hardy [alternately Hardi] de Boisblanc, a former member of the
Superior Council; and a planter of note, [Joseph] Villeré, the commander of the German
Coast.”76 Of these notable members of society, Governor Ulloa believed that the principle, as
well as most important and influential of the conspirators were the Attorney General Nicholas
Chauvin de Lafrénière, and Denis-Nicolas Foucault, the French commissaire-ordonateur, or
commissary.77
Most historiography of the revolt holds that Denis-Nicolas Foucault’s motives for
rebellion were largely personal and financial. Like most of the French colonists, Foucault had
some reservations about working with Ulloa and the changes that the new Spanish regime would
bring. Also like many of his peers he found Ulloa to be standoffish and impersonal. It would be
fair to say that by the time of the rebellion Foucault also bore considerable reservations about, if
not ill will toward, acting French governor Charles Philippe Aubry, perhaps fueled by the sharp
contrasts in their lifestyles and personalities. While Aubry maintained a position of power in the
colony, he was at a lack for funds in part due to Foucault’s refusal to augment his funding, and
was forced to live in a style he felt beneath his station as governor. By contrast, Foucault was
able to live quite comfortably and maintained appearances perhaps above his station. Carl
Brasseaux suggests that the disparity between the lifestyles and status of the two gentlemen as
well as a particular blend of political reliance on each other to effectively run the colony and
competition with each other for status within the colony bred enmity between them.78 Years of
struggle with officials of the prior French administration, many of whom felt Foucault to be low-
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class, may very well have prepared Foucault to be more sensitive to perceived slights. Likewise,
rapid shifts in the political system and turns of political alliance that took place in the 1760’s
may have caused Foucault to be considerably more focused on self-preservation and personal
advancement. In any event, the enmity between Foucault and both governors of Louisiana
intensified as the Spanish economic regulations were put in place.79
Regardless of any speculation as to the source of his discontentment with the joint
Spanish/French regime, there is no doubt that Denis-Nicolas Foucault disagreed strongly with
the Spanish government on its policies of redeeming French paper currency at seventy-five
percent of face value. Historians have not reached a firm consensus as to a specific dominant
cause of this disagreement. A number of contributing causes have emerged. Some historians
like, John Preston Moore, feel that Foucault was speculating in the paper currency, and needed
the Spaniards to redeem the notes at a higher value in order to secure his personal fortune.80 Carl
Brasseaux is quite a bit more sympathetic to Foucault when ascertaining his motives. In
Brasseaux’s estimation, while Foucault certainly stood to lose money by the exchange, and other
Spanish regulatory policies, his disparagement of the Spanish system was not based on personal
matters alone. Brasseaux asserts that Foucault was understandably concerned about the impact
of a less than total face-value revaluation of the paper currency on the cash flow of the
government, and ability to procure supplies for incoming Acadian settlers, for which and whom
he was in part responsible.81 Lack of funds provided by the Spaniards forced Foucault to take
loans from local merchants – putting him in the delicate position of owing money to those over
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whom he had political authority. Furthermore if neither the Spanish nor French governments
reimbursed Foucault, he could be liable for debt he could not repay.82
Ultimately, irrespective of whether Foucault’s motives were being driven by personal
enmity and desire to profit, or concern over the well-being of the colony and his ability to
minister to its economic good, Foucault did play a role in the Superior Council’s conspiracy
against Governor Ulloa. Foucault became a sympathizer and supporter of the rebellion.
Brasseaux characterizes this support as mostly passive. However by refusing to perform, or
slowly performing, certain routine administrative duties, Foucault was able to engender
dissatisfaction with the government in many colonists, particularly those of prominence who
would have had business dealings that Foucault’s obstructionist actions would have impacted.83
During the rebellion, Foucault “was negligent in allowing the printing of anti-Spanish literature
in New Orleans, failed to notify the acting governor of the circulation of the petition [to remove
Ulloa from the colony], and entertained his fellow councilors after they had approved the illegal
petition during the special session.”84
Carl Brasseuax also places an indirect responsibility for the revolt on the disagreements
and quarreling between the French offices of governor, which was held by Charles Philippe
Aubry (jointly with Governor Ulloa), and the offices of commissaire-ordonnateur, held by
Denis-Nicolas Foucault. In the “build-up” to the rebellion, this quarreling effectively “paralyzed
the provincial administration, creating a leadership vacuum which the New Orleans rebels would
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ultimately fill.”85 Perhaps Foucault’s most important contribution to the rebellion was his
consistent deferral to the will of Attorney General Nicholas Chauvin de Lafrénière.86 With these
consistent deferrals of legal opinion Foucault removed himself as a check on Lafrénière, and
greatly increased Lafrénière’s prestige and political power, thus allowing Lafrénière to more
completely fill the role of opposition leader.
Popular, powerful, imposing, and charming, Attorney General Nicholas Chauvin de
Lafrénière played the role of charismatic leader in the rebellion - swaying the Superior Council
and those others among the colonists who felt the malaise of dissatisfaction with the Spaniards to
actively participate in the cause of the rebellion.87 In terms of physical and social presence,
Lafrénière was everything that Governor Ulloa was not – dashing, eloquent, energetic, and
masculine. So commanding was Lafrénière that R. E. Chandler, in his notes to “Ulloa's Account
of the 1768 Revolt”, suggests that Lafrénière was able to use his “spell-binding oratory” not only
to seduce officials and prominent citizens to the rebel’s cause, but also to verbally dominate and
over-rule the wishes of acting governor Aubry.88
His powerful presence, positive reputation and political status as Attorney General and
member of the Superior Council enabled Lafrénière to spread discontent amongst the “common”
citizenry using the tools of gossip and slander. The Attorney General also played a role in
undermining the Spanish authority by exerting political pressure on the French members of the
dual colonial government against the Spanish interests, and projecting himself forward into the
minds of the citizenry by “assuming leadership at assemblies called to discuss the most
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momentous decisions of the day” - often at the political expense of the Spanish regime.89
Lafrénière also acted as a galvanizing presence behind which the dispossessed French could
rally. His orations before the Superior Council neatly address the complaints of merchants and
traders, and combined them with the complaints and anxieties (exaggerated by the conspirators)
of the Acadian settlers and German coast farmers. Lafrénière, possibly through his legal
training, correspondence or visitation with European thinkers, developed skill with expressing
the language of enlightenment philosophy which would have provided a method of initial
indoctrination.90
Perhaps the most important aspect of his role as ring-leader was the attorney general’s
recruiting of influential men who could provide popular support from disparate groups. It was
Lafrénière who persuaded Commandant Roget de Villeré to convince the settlers on the German
coast that they needed to march on New Orleans in order to force Governor Ulloa to pay for the
goods, fruits, and vegetables that were purchased from them throughout the year (primarily to
feed the Acadians).91 Likewise, Lafrénière was instrumental in convincing militia captains
Judice and André Veret to rally Acadian immigrants to New Orleans under the pretense that
Governor Ulloa held a store of silver which he could be pressured into using to back the
worthless paper notes that many of the Acadians had carried with them from Canada.92
In contrast to Brasseaux’s characterization of Foucault, Jo Ann Carrigan characterizes
Nicholas Chauvin de Lafrénière’s motives as personal ambition and, to a degree, the quest for
visible status, tempered by an opposition to a Spanish system Lafrénière believed to be “arbitrary
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government and mercantilism.”93 Lafrénière is another figure that the historiography has viewed
through lenses biased toward either the French or Spanish point of view, and with
correspondingly heroic or villainous overtones. Some historians, such as John Preston Moore
James E. Winston, and Shannon Lee Dawdy, speculate that because of Lafrénière’s European
travels, there may have been some Enlightenment ideology behind his decision to enter into
revolt against the Spaniards.94 Winston maintains a high regard for the impact of philosophy on
Lafrénière, however Moore ultimately concludes that Lafrénière’s motives were likely driven
more by the threat to his personal status and influence, which a more completely implemented
Spanish regime represented, than by idealism.95
Lafrénière’s character, and presence were sharply contrasted by those of Governor Ulloa.
Ulloa, fifty years old by the time he was made governor, was a man of diverse interests and
accomplishments. While serving Spain as a colonial administrator and naval officer Ulloa was
also an explorer, engineer, author of several manuscripts, and a scientist noted in the disciplines
of astronomy, mathematics, biology and chemistry.96 Although Ulloa’s many scientific
accomplishments cemented his status as an intellectual giant, he was not physically imposing.
Described as small, stooped, thin and pale; it is noted that Ulloa was hardly the physical presence
needed to inspire the lax and fearful French colonists, who worried that they had been forgotten
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or cast aside.97 Ulloa’s physical appearance and bookish demeanor complicated his relationship
with the French subjects.
Ulloa possessed a number of qualifications for the position, not the least of which was
experience in the climate of the new world and an understanding of the French language. He
was also keenly intelligent, an experienced colonial administrator, a scientific genius, a naval
officer, and fiercely loyal to the crown.98 Ulloa also possessed a host of other character traits
which made him less than ideally suited for his post. John Preston Moore lists a number of
these. Ulloa was overly concerned with regulation, matters of honor and the minutiae of political
niceties. He could be brusque and short with those he was trying to communicate with. At times
he was too quick to discount the opinions of others.99 The French governor Aubry said that
Ulloa was “sometimes too punctilious and often makes problems out of things that are scarcely
worth the trouble to bother with.”100 Least kind (and bearing an obvious bias against the Spanish
regime), Jean Bochart Champigny characterized Ulloa as “Obstinate… violent… imperious…
arrogant… timid… inconsiderate… and destitute of dignity.”101 But physical appearance and
somewhat odious character traits were not the largest factors at play in Ulloa’s failure to
maintain control of the Louisiana colony.
Nor was the manner of Ulloa’s arrival, though it also proved to be detrimental to his
success as governor in the colony. Stormy weather both prevented large crowds from gathering
97
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to witness Ulloa’s arrival and played a part in Ulloa’s decision to sail into the harbor in a small
packet ship – the Volante, rather than a larger, more impressive vessel.102 Likewise the small
force of ninety Spanish soldiers that arrived with Ulloa was hardly a force suited to strike an
impression of force and control. Ulloa made a critical misstep during his arrival – he did not
raise the Spanish flag. What he interpreted from his orders to be a necessary step to ease the
colony from French to Spanish control only served to confuse the citizenry, and give the
conspirators a powerful visual icon to use as a foothold from which to launch accusations of the
invalidity of the Spanish regime.103 While Ulloa continued to allow the French flag to fly instead
of the Spanish, the situation continued to deteriorate.
Ulloa’s reliance on French troops for support during his administration added to the
perception that the Spanish regime was weak and lessened his authority. However, despite
repeated requests to Viceroy Buccarreli for Spanish officers and soldiers, Ulloa had to use the
French troops still garrisoned in Louisiana, as well as local militias.104 This was problematic for
a few reasons. Not only was this a sign of Spanish impermanence or possibly even illegitimacy,
it was also draining on the French troops who believed themselves likely to be recalled at any
time to France, with their terms of service in the colony over.105 Ulloa also believed those
French troops to be extremely unreliable and lazy. He complained in a letter to Viceroy
Buccarreli that they “refused to do anything that is for the service of his Royal Majesty, asking
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for extra wages for everything they do.”106 The net effect was that Ulloa failed to make a
suitable impression of Spanish rule.
This was compounded by Ulloa’s dislike of public display.107 That dislike prevented him
from establishing the Spanish presence in the grand way expected by the French colonists. This
not only served to rob the Spanish regime of legitimacy by stripping it of what would have been
viewed as the trappings of legitimacy, it also served to engender hostility from the entrenched
“better classes” in the colony, who viewed Ulloa as snobbish or stand-offish. That perception of
Ulloa was strengthened by his frequent trips from the social center of New Orleans to the site
which would become the newly constructed southern fort at Balize. Ulloa visited Balize in order
to shore up defenses there against a possible invasion from the British, which he viewed as an
urgent if not imminent threat (and to conduct scientific experiments).108 However his visits were
interpreted by the French colonists as a desire to supplant or circumvent New Orleans society by
moving the capital of government to a new location.109 This seeming disregard for traditional
French social structures and mores both lent credence to some aspects of the “Black Legend”
related to supposed Spanish aloofness and cruelty, but also fostered the kind of social disconnect
that facilitates rebellion – the weakening of inherited norms and traditions that act to reinforce
stability in society.110
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In June of 1767 Governor Ulloa married Doña Francísca Ramirez de Larada y Encalda.
This union only complicated matters in Louisiana for the governor.111 Ulloa chose to take the
young, well connected and wealthy Chilean lady as his bride, possibly angering many of the
local Louisiana elite who would have preferred the governor to marry from within the colony,
thus solidifying political alliances there. Additionally, Ulloa chose to have his marriage
ceremony away from New Orleans, in Balize, which caused the colonial elite, who by and large
resided in New Orleans, to feel snubbed all over again.112 In a similar manner the pregnancy of
Lady Ulloa led to more social misunderstandings. The customary feting by visitors and well
wishers of the mother-to-be was not to the liking of Ulloa or his bride, nor was worshipping in
public, primarily because of health concerns.113
Ulloa also simply did not communicate well with the colonists, a failing that contributed
greatly to the accumulation of problems leading to rebellion. In part this was a function of the
conspirators residing in the government at a level between Ulloa and the populace. They were
able to put negative interpretation and/or connotation to Ulloa’s policies, and effectively control
perception of Ulloa through uncontested rumor and misinformation. Practically since Spain
gained control of the colony, rumors regarding potential Spanish reforms played a role in the
popular dissatisfaction with the regime.114 Had Ulloa managed to create a direct channel of
official information, he would have avoided a lot of ill will from the colonists who were
genuinely uninformed or misinformed of the governor’s problems and plans. However, Ulloa
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did not create such a channel of information and as a result he and his policies were susceptible
to the machinations of those who would slander them.
The involvement of French officials in the process of governing often caused
announcements contradictory or mitigating to Spanish intent to be made alongside official
proclamations. This was the case in 1766, when Governor Aubry speculated that the Spaniards
would not enforce the trade restrictions passed earlier that year.115 Such speculation acted to cast
a cloud of weakness or incompetence on Governor Ulloa, and one of illegitimacy on the Spanish
government. In a similar vein, the involvement of the French Superior Council in the governing
process perpetuated a sense of doubt in the Spanish government. It is entirely possible that the
relationship that powerful merchants and planters had with the members of the Superior Council
gave them avenues of information outside of those which the Spanish government controlled.
Through these channels the conspirators in the council were able to challenge Spanish
legitimacy.
A lack of information was another of Ulloa’s principle problems. Ulloa lacked a reliable
source of information. The information he received was often from French soldiers, many of
whom were disgruntled over not being allowed to return to France, had loyalties and connections
to their regional commandants, or were sympathetic to the conspirators. The conspirators were
able to organize themselves, grow their ranks, and even sign petitions for Ulloa’s removal – all
seemingly with Ulloa none the wiser.116 Ulloa also overlooked good intelligence when it was
presented to him, often because he believed the information to be unsubstantiated or from a
biased source. This was the case on the twenty-first of October, 1768, when a colonist, angered
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by a Superior Council decision, brought to Ulloa allegations that members of the council were
fomenting discontent along the German Coast. The allegations were true, but Ulloa disregarded
them as they came from a source which he considered to be biased and therefore untrustworthy –
his sense of honor, a product of his upper class Andalusian upbringing, and well honed during
his time in the Spanish navy, ruled his behavior when a suspicious nature would have been more
prudent.117
By contrast the conspirators were in positions to know much about Governor Ulloa, as
well as his plans for governance, and they were able to selectively release and color that
information in ways that cast the governor in the poorest light possible. The conspirators also
held great influence over the colony through appointment, relationship, reputation and status.
The conspirators used their positions, through societal status, inter-relationships, and
governmental appointment to control to a great degree how the governor was perceived by the
populace. Foucault was able to slow down official business, creating an air of incompetence or
snobbish disdain with affairs of state. He was also able to put leverage through the Association
of Merchants on potential members of the coup plot.118 Lafrénière was able to use his
considerable charm and connections to circumvent Spanish efforts to maintain calm in the
colony, and generate resentment against the alien government.
Relationships played a remarkably strong role in the organization of the rebellion.
Lafrénière alone was related to nearly half of the other main conspirators through blood or
marriage. Governor Ulloa made a listing of several familial connections in his account of the
revolt. Joseph Villeré, the Captain of the German coast, was Lafrénière’s brother in law.
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Captain François La Barre, a militia captain at English Turn and member of the Superior
Council, was a cousin by marriage. François Chauvin de Lery, the Commandant of
Tchapitoulas, was Lafrénière’s cousin. Piere Marquis, was attached to Lafrénière through an
unspecified relation to Lafrénière’s wife.119 The prominent businessman and planter JeanBaptiste Noyan was Lafrénière’s son-in-law. Finally, as previously mentioned, Commandant
Charles Fredereick D’Arensbourg was the grandfather of Lafrénière’s wife.120 D’Arensbourg
himself acted as a sort of social “spoke” in connecting the conspirators. Through his descendants
a number of prominent families were connected, including “Lafrénière, Noyan, Bienville,
Massan, Villeré, and de Lery.”121
These bonds served to allow for a very tight-knit cabal, contributing to the lack of
information the Spanish Governor was able to obtain. Those relationships also provided
reasonable cover for meetings and ready access to the exchange of information, propaganda, and
mobilization without fear of internal betrayal. As previously shown, Lafrénière convinced
Judice and Andre Veret to gather the Acadians in New Orleans under the pretense that they were
to have their worthless Canadian paper currency redeemed by Ulloa who maintained a secret
horde of Spanish coin.122 Lafrénière was also able to convince Commandant D’Arensbourg and
Captain Joseph de Villiere to create rumor that Ulloa would not honor debts for foodstuffs, then
engineer a shortfall of that payment to garner the support of the German Coast settlers. Though
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the elder Baltasar Villeré refused to join with the conspiracy, he was not in a position to reveal
the conspiracy to Ulloa.123
If there is one recurring theme in the events that led up to the revolt of 1768, it is
instability. Among the contributing elements were the financial disruptions of inflation, lack of
specie along with the concomitant variety of greatly depressed paper monies, irregularity of aid
from Europe, changes in commercial policy, potential changes in the governing body, political
infighting, confusion over the legitimacy of Spanish rule, the composite French and Spanish
government, and a weak central government attempting to enforce unpopular regulations.124
This instability exacerbated ethnic tensions, and gave the conspirators a “cause célèbre” they
could draw upon for an almost instant credibility: the “poisonous wine from Catalonia.”125 The
conspirators used this credibility, ethnic tension, and an almost ever present unease over the
worsening economic circumstances to build a powerful coalition against the new Spanish
government out of the disparate interests and factions.
The overriding themes that presented themselves after the coup had been launched were
confusion, and delay. As just mentioned, Governor Ulloa was slow to react to rumors that there
was a mounting conspiracy against him. The governor’s lax control over the colony allowed the
conspirators to easily not only circumvent his measures to contain the problem, by preventing the
payment of owed money to the German Coast farmers, but they also were able to turn those
efforts to their own ends, by utilizing the money sent. Upon hearing of the detained St. Maxent,
and the loss of the money meant to pay the German Coast farmers, Ulloa held a conference with
Governor Aubry to determine the best course of action. Aubry advised that Governor Ulloa do
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nothing, which was the approach that Ulloa initially took. Aubry’s reason for this was that he
felt that the situation was far less harmful that it turned out to be. He thought that a formal
protest was all that would come of the gathering force against the Spanish governor. 126 Had
Ulloa acted with force, Aubry believed, he might have provided the spark which would have
turned the protest into revolt.
On October twenty-seventh, Governor Aubry approached Foucault and Lafrénière with a
polite request that they cease agitating the public against Ulloa. The conspirators refused. This
proved the wrong approach to take, and Aubry’s overture for a peaceful resolution, and his lack
of willingness to project force to maintain the Spanish regime were seen as a signs of weakness
by the conspirators.127 Lafrénière and Foucault informed Governor Aubry that it was their
intention to have Ulloa removed from the colony within three days “with the least possible
disturbance because things had gone so far that it was impossible to draw back.”128 Pierre
Marquis, recently appointed Colonel by the Superior Council, maintained a militia five
companies strong and loyal to the conspirators. The number of the rebels roughly doubled as a
force of some five hundred Germans and Acadians led by Villeré and Noyan respectively
marched into New Orleans and gathered for the first night of the rebellion at the home of
François Chauvin de Lery.129 By the morning of the twenty-eighth of October, roughly one
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thousand insurgents under the command of Pierre Marquis patrolled the streets of New Orleans
unopposed.130
On the eve of the rebellion Ulloa felt that he did not have the men to handle the situation.
With only one hundred or so men at his disposal against a crowd which is estimated to have
numbered in the hundreds, in all probability, he did not. After consulting with Aubry – in whom
Governor Ulloa still had faith to resolve the situation peacefully, Ulloa made the decision to
retreat with his pregnant wife and child to the packet ship Volante, accompanied by “all Spanish
military personnel, with all those of Spanish descent or sympathizers among the French welcome
to join the defense of the boat”, as a precautionary measure he ordered all important papers to be
destroyed and the ship’s guns readied for defense against the rebels.131
For his part, Governor Aubry sent an additional twenty soldiers to join Ulloa on the
Volante, detached another thirty to the central square, and kept the remainder to rally a small
force of seventy to eighty men should a confrontation with the forces of the Superior Council be
necessary.132 Following this, Governor Aubry made another appeal to Foucault and Lafrénière
to abandon the conspiracy, insisting to them that they stood to risk everything for little chance of
any gain.133 As before, Aubry’s appeals to the conspirators had little effect, other than perhaps
contributing to Denis-Nicolas Foucault’s decision to take a more passive and cautious role in the
rebellion from that point forward.134
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The following day, October twenty-ninth, the Superior Council met at Foucault’s
residence in New Orleans to compile a list of grievances against Governor Ulloa. To prevent
any disruption from Governor Aubry’s small force that remained in the city, the Superior
Council arranged patrols of militia and gatherings of supporters shouting angrily for removal of
the Spaniard.135 At Ulloa’s behest Aubry was present, and again offered a remonstration against
the conspirators but “neither prayer nor threats could produce any impression, except on two or
three, who seemed to be moderate, and that the rest allowed themselves to be swayed by the
sentiments of Lafrénière.”136 It was clear to Ulloa at least that at this point his most powerful
ally, Aubry, had lost all influence with the Superior Council, if not the majority of the French
populace.137 After deliberating, the Council prepared their petition of six points to be sent to the
king of France.
The proclamation listed grievances and attacks against the character of Governor Ulloa as
evidence of the perfidy committed by the same and justification for his removal. Through their
complaints, the Superior Council systematically attacked the legitimacy of the Spanish regime in
Louisiana by claiming that no Spanish policy had lawfully replaced the pre-existing French
policies.
In large part their basis for this claim was that “Mr. Ulloa” failed to show proof that the
colony was ceded to Spain. John Preston Moore points out that Lafrénière was correct on the
point that Governor Ulloa did not follow the formal protocol for accepting the colony, but
hastens to add that in accepting Spanish money and following Spanish directives, Louisiana had
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been a Spanish colony nonetheless.138 However, regardless of the validity of the Attorney
General’s claims, the council delivered these points at a time when the conspirators had shown
that the Spanish forces under Ulloa could not hold the colony through force. As they had in the
past with Governor Kerlerec, “the leaders of the conspiracy turned once again to force as a
solution to their economic and social ills.”139 Emboldened by popular support, ideological
grounds, and strength of arms the Superior Council (minus only the dissenting voice of Govenor
Aubry, and moderating voice of Foucault who wished Governor Ulloa removed from power but
not expelled) demanded the removal of Governor Ulloa within three days of the proclamation
date, October 29th, 1768, on “whatever ship he shall think proper”.140
By early afternoon on the twenty-ninth, the Superior Council had a copy of the
proclamation delivered to Ulloa. Upon receiving it, Ulloa ordered the Spanish Commissary
Loyola to end all funds meant for French soldiers and officials in the colony and to halt the
purchase of all gifts meant as presents for native tribes. He also ordered all Spanish troops in the
colony be recalled to Havana.141 Governor Ulloa used the three days allotted to him by the
Superior Council to purchase passage on a French merchant vessel, the frigate Cesár, as the
packet ship Volante was in need of repairs and not seaworthy. He left New Orleans at the end of
his allotted time.142 The Cesár delayed a short while in Balize for re-supply, and to wait out
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weather not fit for sailing. Then the Cesár proceeded south across the Gulf to Havana and
arrived in the Cuban capital on December 3rd, 1768.143
Though Governor Ulloa had it in mind that he would return to New Orleans both with the
battalion which had been assembling in Havana for his use and with additional Spanish support,
he was never to see that city or any of Louisiana again. In the brief interim wherein the rebels
held power, Aubry was still nominally the acting Governor of the colony. However, as he
complained to the French court, he held little power and considered the nature of his tenure as
one of continued indignity to the office of Governor.144 This is not to say that Aubry held no
power in the colony, however. Aubry, for a time, using threats of force and forceful appeals to
the Council, was able to prevent Lafrénière and Foucault from removing the Volante from the
river. From its position, the Volante was able to fire on ships moving into New Orleans and kept
smuggling, which the Superior Council depended on for finance after Ulloa’s departure, at a
reduced level thus contributing to the malaise and enervation suffered by the Superior Council’s
temporary government.145 Aubry’s remaining vestiges of command aside, the real driving force
behind governance at this time was the Superior Council, and it’s most prominent and powerful
member the Attorney General Nicolas Chauvin de Lafrénière. Denis-Nicolas Foucault remained
a strong presence “behind the scenes” but wished to limit the visible extent of his involvement as
he was wary of how the European powers would view the revolt and wished to protect his
career.146
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After the crescendo of October twenty-eighth and ninth the new administration lost a lot
of momentum and a degree of popular support. In part this was because it was, at heart, a
reactionary movement. It is hard to keep up enthusiasm for a return to the status quo once it has
been restored. The conspirators proved themselves to be better adept at overthrowing a
government than running one themselves. In general the rebels maintained a hope that the
colony would be welcomed back by the French king. However they had no clear plan as to how
to maintain the government in the meantime or, other than the republican leanings of Pierre
Marquis, no clear inclination of what to do if the French king refused to accept them.147 In an
attempt to maintain control, solidify popular support, and justify their actions to the European
monarch they wished to rejoin, the conspirators published a list of their grievances and
condemnations of Governor Ulloa and as well as their forceful rejection of the Spanish
mercantile system for the colony.148
They also began appointing syndics from the ranks of men who were well connected and
had supported the rebellion.149 The office of syndic was a French innovation in which honored
or distinguished gentlemen acted as a kind of intermediary between the citizenry and the
government. That measure expanded the powerbase of the insurgents by incorporating
sympathizers into the power structure. But printed propaganda and the appointment of syndics
was not enough to maintain popular support. What the people wanted most was a sense of
security. After the departure of Ulloa, the Superior Council saw a small reversal of popularity
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with Governor Aubry rising in the eyes of many French soldiers and the Council losing the
support of the German Coast settlers, though the German Coast proved to be resistant to the
acceptance of Spanish rule upon the arrival of Lieutenant General Alejandro O’Reilly, almost
certainly for economic reasons.150
There is little evidence that the revolt actually acted to improve the conditions causing
discomfort to the colonists. Lack of financial means caused a great degree of their difficulty.
Governor Aubry had a hand in this as it was his stern refusal to allow the Volante to be removed
that prevented the flow of trade into the city which the Superior Council depended on to finance
their new government. The Superior Council had a far larger problem in the lack of funds from
either the Spanish or French crowns – money the colony had always needed to function. With a
lack of funding and no clear direction to move the new government, a complacency and sense of
ennui set in.151
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CHAPTER II
O’REILLY RESTORES ORDER
The awaited, and feared, Spanish response to the rebellion came in the form of the arrival
of Lieutenant General Don Alejandro O’Reilly, nearly nine months after the removal of
Governor Ulloa. Alejandro O’Reilly was an Irish soldier of fortune in service to Spain, who had
served with honor and distinction in His Most Catholic Majesty’s army since the age of ten,
some 37 years before the Louisiana revolt.152 He was recognized for bravery, skill and valor in
the wars of Austrian Succession, the Seven Years War, and most recently during the 1766 riots
in Madrid, when he oversaw the protection of Charles III’s royal palace from angry mobs.153 In
addition to his bravery, talent and martial skills, O’Reilly proved to have the insight of a sharp
colonial administrator in his short time in Cuba assessing and re-organizing the army. While
there he made several prudent observations and recommendations toward improving security and
efficiency.154 This experience, and his deep personal respect for the Lieutenant General,
convinced King Charles III that O’Reilly was the right man for the job of restoring order in
Louisiana.155
The arrival of O’Reilly represents the final stage of Welch’s model – the end of the
rebellion. The Lieutenant General Alejandro O’Reilly’s actions in Louisiana show how a
mixture of repression and conciliation effectively pacify a populace. From the start of his
administration, O’Reilly displayed an overwhelming force that denied the Louisiana rebels the
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hope of being able to withstand a direct confrontation. O’Reilly backed that force up with
sensible policies and reforms that made life better for colonists, and addressed many of their
concerns. While doing so he made sure to drive a wedge between those members of the
conspiracy who directed action against the government and those who followed. This split
allowed O’Reilly the means to reconcile the majority of colonists with the Spanish government
while excising from the colony the most dangerous rebels.
On July 24, 1769, news of O’Reilly’s imminent arrival reached Governor Aubry, who
was overwhelmed with joy at the return of Spanish order (and funds).156 Many of the colonists
echoed Aubry’s sense of relief – regardless of the manner of the Spanish return, Spanish rule
would be more orderly, and the economic situation could hardly be less prosperous than it had
been under the interim government.157
But there was more to the lack of resistance to O’Reilly than a cooling passion for revolt,
general confusion as to the direction of governance, and slowed momentum. O’Reilly brought
several powerful tools to combat insurgency. First he brought a great deal of money to the
colony. Financial aid helped to reduce the discontent of the subjects and lessen the economic
crisis. O’Reilly brought measures to reform the governmental and economic systems to bring
them into clear and well delineated and productive forms. Finally O’Reilly brought an
overwhelming force coupled with the skill and acumen to use that force judiciously, lest it
become a point of instigation rather than a deterrent. Even had O’Reilly not possessed a forceful
personality, powerful public presence, tactful approach to diplomacy and keen mind, any two of
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these factors would likely have been enough to settle the uprising and prevent any future
outbreaks.158
Lieutenant General Alejandro O’Reilly set out to Louisiana with a force that would
overwhelm the rebels, either awing them into submission or defeating them without challenge.
His aim was not only to suppress the revolt, but also to impress upon the revolutionaries the
majesty, grandeur, and might of His Most Catholic Majesty. O’Reilly brought with him to
Louisiana 2,700 soldiers sailing on 27 ships.159 The force consisted of “a Battalion from Lisbon,
another from the troops at Havana; eighty men from a Company of Grenadiers from each of the
three militia corps at Havana; 150 artillerymen; 40 dragoons and 50 soldiers from the cavalry
militia from Havana; and 150 Catalan riflemen”, as well as 50 pieces of artillery, and the
armaments on the ships themselves.160 In contrast to the Louisiana militias, these were highly
trained professional soldiers – many of the units selected were either chosen by O’Reilly himself
for this duty or formed as part of the Fixed Louisiana Infantry Battalion that had been slowly
growing in Havana for the use of Governor Ulloa.161 The Lieutenant General developed a
training program under which local militia units would be trained under Spanish soldiers. He
meant this force of militias to supplement the Fixed Infantry Battalion as the colony’s major
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defensive (and policing) force. By the time O’Reilly left Louisiana (taking the bulk of his
Spanish regulars with him), the Fixed Louisiana Infantry Battalion number over 500 men – 412
Spaniards and at least 100 foreign troops, mostly French.162
In addition to these considerable forces, Governor Aubry pledged the full support of
himself and his troops to O’Reilly.163 The fighting men loyal to the Superior Council
meanwhile had dwindled in the period of malaise after the initial thrilling spasm of revolution.
Though there is not a reliable source of information on the total number of fighting men left to
the rebels on the eve of O’Reilly’s arrival, O’Reilly in all likelihood enjoyed a far greater than
three to one advantage. With the disparity between the number, training, morale, and equipment
of the troops between the two forces, it must have seemed obvious that O’Reilly’s soldiers would
have easily won any conflict.
In addition to overwhelming force, O’Reilly also brought an air of authority the
Louisianans found lacking in Governor Ulloa. In terms of physical and social presence,
Lieutenant General O’Reilly was everything that Ulloa was not. O’Reilly was “physically stout,
well formed and taller than average” with a slight limp due to a wound received in a military
action.164 Of his personality it was said that he was “energetic, firm in his opinions, and
confident to the point of arrogance” – the last trait tempered by his “intelligence and lofty
ambition”, skill with duplicity, and years of court life in Madrid, during which he developed a
“certain polish and courtesy.”165 The demeanor he assumed when dealing with the rebels was
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stern and austere. Accounts attribute to him an air of solemnity, dignity, and authority. When
O’Reilly had the rebels summoned to meet with him, he adopted an appearance of magnanimity
bordering on sympathy.
During his meeting with the delegates from the Superior Council, O’Reilly chose his
words carefully, allowing Nicolas Chauvin Lafrénière, Pierre Marquis and Joseph Milhet to
believe that he would not seek to punish them for their roles in the rebellion. There is some
debate as to whether this constituted some sort of deceit on his part, an act to mollify the rebels
and lure them from any consideration of flight.166 Given O’Reilly’s willingness to use deception
when necessary, and intent to prevent either another revolt or worse, an exodus to British Florida
which would have robbed the colony of valuable citizens, it is entirely likely that O’Reilly meant
to deceive the conspirators into believing that they had nothing to fear from his investigations,
but in doing so was careful to avoid any outright lies.167 Whether O’Reilly lied, evaded the truth,
or spoke honestly and earnestly without intent to deceive the result was certainly in line with his
wishes. A relative calm settled in at New Orleans, and none of the rebel leadership attempted to
flee Spanish justice.
After a consultation with Governor Aubry, on August 21st, Lieutenant General Alejandro
O’Reilly summoned those considered to be the ring-leaders of the insurrection for their trial.
O’Reilly had arrested the following twelve members of the rebellion’s leadership: Nicolas
Chauvin de Lafrénière, Jean Baptiste de Noyan, Joseph Villeré, Pierre Caresse, Pierre Marquis,
Joseph Milhet, Jean Milhet, Joseph Petit, Balthasar de Masan, Julien Jerome Doucet, Pierre
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Poupet, and Hardy de Boisblanc.168 The arrests caused a stir in the city of New Orleans, and
O’Reilly, fearing a desertion of citizens to the English colonies, ordered a proclamation stating:
In the name of the King,
We, Alexander O'Reilly, Commander of Benfayan in the order of
Alcantara, Major General and Inspector General of the armies of his Catholic
Majesty, Captain General and Governor of the Province of Louisiana, in virtue of
his Catholic Majesty's orders, and of the powers with which we are invested,
declare to all the inhabitants of the Province of Louisiana, that, whatever just
cause past events may have given his Majesty to make them feel his indignation,
yet his majesty's intention is to listen only to the inspirations of his royal
clemency, because he is persuaded that the inhabitants of Louisiana would not
have committed the offence of which they are guilty, if they had not been seduced
by the intrigues of some ambitious, fanatic, and evil-minded men, who had the
temerity to make a criminal use of the ignorance, and excessive credulity of their
fellow citizens. These men alone will answer for their crime, and will be judged in
accordance with the laws.
So generous an act on the part of his Majesty must be a pledge to him that
his new subjects will endeavor, every day of their lives, to deserve by their
fidelity, zeal and obedience, the pardon and protection which he grants them from
this moment.169
This proclamation, posted in various positions throughout New Orleans had the desired effect of
calming the populace and preventing any mass panic.
The proclamation also drew a sharp distinction between the actions of those caught up in
the confusion of the moment, or seduced by the conspirators, and the criminalized actions of the
conspirators. In doing so the proclamation stripped the revolt of any nobility or shared purpose
which its ideological grounds might have granted it. In this way the proclamation also
introduced a wedge between the people who had supported the rebellion and their leadership,
thus dramatically reducing the possibility of further civil disobedience in support of the leaders
of the coup. The proclamation also cast a shadow of criminality and illegitimacy on the revolt as
it would be recorded and thus remembered, and so potentially reduced its power as an inspiration
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to any future malcontents. It is debatable, to say the least, that O’Reilly intended the
proclamation to be an exercise in public relations to future generations. However it certainly was
in his interests to make sure the leaders of the coup were not remembered as either heroes of the
people, or as martyrs to a greater cause.
The trial was swift – lasting only two months. On October 24th, 1769, the court had
reached its verdicts for the accused - all guilty.170 Nicolas Chauvin Lafrénière was found guilty
of abusing his position of Attorney General and inspiring the populace to sedition. His sentence
was death.171 Felix del Rey accused Jean-Baptiste Noyan of inciting the Acadians to take up
arms, spreading complaints against Governor Ulloa, urging the Superior Council to have Ulloa
expelled, and refusing to accept Spanish rule.172 For his crimes Noyan also received a penalty of
death. Pierre Marquis also received a death sentence for his crimes of inciting the militia to
revolt against Ulloa, accepting a position in the illegal government, advocating the institution of
a republic in Louisiana, and for voting to approve the “Memorial” against the Spanish
administration of Louisiana.173 Pierre Caresse likewise received a death sentence for his crimes
of leading an armed militia in the revolt, his part in the drafting of the “Memorial” and for
“spreading among the colonists the seeds of sedition”, and for helping to form the Bank of
Monte Pio in the illegal government.174 Del Rey accused Joseph Milhet of sedition, accepting a
position in the new government, and soliciting money to help pay for the new government.
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Milhet also received a penalty of death.175 Joseph Villeré was posthumously accused of treason
and sedition as well as held accountable for his role in preventing St. Maxent from delivering
money to the Acadians and Germans of the German Coast.176 Had it not been for the fact that he
had already died while a prisoner aboard the Volante, allegedly from wounds gained while
resisting arrest, Villeré would have most assuredly received a death sentence.177 As there were
no hangmen in New Orleans at the time, the death sentences of the conspirators were to be
carried out by firing squads composed of Spanish soldiers.178
The rest of the accused were found to have committed less serious offenses, and did not
receive the death penalty. Joseph Petit received a sentence of “perpetual exile in prison” for his
crimes of speaking publicly against Spanish commercial regulations, his part in calling for the
ousting of Ulloa and the forcing of the departure of the Volante, as well as his willingness to set
out for Balize and actively resist O’Reilly.179 Del Rey accused Balthasar Masan of forcing
citizens to sign the Council’s petition to the King of France asking for the retrocession of the
colony, refusing to assist Aubry in maintaining control, and aiding the rebels. He received a
sentence of ten years imprisonment.180 Julien Jeromé Doucet also received ten years for
collaborating with the rebels in the drawing up of the “Memorial” and other documents as well
as helping them to justify the rebellion.181 Joseph Milhet’s brother Jean received charges of
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speaking out against Spanish regulations, supporting the Superior Council’s “Memorial”, and
leading a section of the militia during the actual rebellion itself. Despite the seriousness of these
charges, Jean Milhet was considered a minor accomplice and received only six years
imprisonment for his role in the revolt.182 Another minor accomplice, Pierre Poupet was charged
with being the treasurer for the rebels after the rebellion had occurred. For this he also received
six years imprisonment.183 Pierre Hardi de Boisblanc also received a six year prison term for
being a minor accomplice. Boisblanc was charged by del Rey with setting up the Bank of Monte
Pio for the rebels as well as for having had a “conspiratorial association with Lafrénière and
Foucault.”184 The prisoners were shortly thereafter sent to Havana, Cuba to fulfill their various
sentences.185 All of those sentenced to death and imprisonment also had their property forfeited
to the Crown.
In addition to these twelve conspirators there were others who acted sympathetically to
the rebellion. While not an immediate threat, those sympathizers might have produced trouble
for Spanish authority in the colony. Therefore O’Reilly decided to have them removed from the
colony and their return barred. The total number banished in this way was 27, including one Mr.
Lessassier, who was already in France at the time and three Jews, who, in the only incident of the
whole trial which brought the “black legend” to mind, were expelled for their religion, and
suspect business practices.186 Despite the impressive force he brought, O’Reilly fully realized
that he could not reconcile the colony to Spanish rule by force alone.
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To help show the colonists of Louisiana the benefits of Spanish rule, Alejandro O’Reilly
also brought a large amount of money with him to Louisiana. On top of the payment for his
soldiers, he brought an expense account of 150,000 pesos. Jack D.L. Holmes estimates that
O’Reilly spent over 260,000 pesos before ever reaching Louisiana.187 O’Reilly also moved
quickly to resume the flow of Spanish funds, make sure that French soldiers in service received
their back pay, and sought to redeem 100,000 pesos worth of paper currency with specie.188 In
addition to confirming French land grants, and implementing a legal basis for land titles,
O’Reilly continued Ulloa’s land grant and aid programs to increase the settlement of the colonial
interior. Immigrants received land as well as food, tools and money to ease their transition into
the colony.189 Such programs could not have helped but to allay fears over the “tyranny” of the
Spaniards.
O’Reilly streamlined government operations and trimmed wasteful and inefficient
spending. He reduced the number of posts with stores in the colony, and the personnel required
to fully man them.190 To prevent inflation from accompanying the Spanish monies into
Louisiana, O’Reilly fixed the prices of food, wood and some basic services such as cartage.191 In
addition to the regulation of inflation, these set prices helped to lessen discontent due to
shortages of staple foods by preventing price gouging by unscrupulous merchants. Taxes were
imposed on “taverns, inns, billiard parlors, and butcher stalls”, which along with proceeds from
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renting royal property, paid for “the conduct of city business.”192 Funds were also generated
through the levying of duties on anchorage at New Orleans and “special taxes” on imported
brandy.193 To revive the flagging colonial trade O’Reilly suggested that the colony be allowed to
operate under relaxed trade restrictions and granted open trade with Spain and Havana, provided
the appropriate duties were paid. By January of 1770, Louisianans were able to export and
import duty free from the port of Havana.194
In addition to trade reforms, O’Reilly spent a considerable amount of time reforming the
legislative, executive and judicial functions of the government. To begin with, as soon as his
fleet could be sailed up from New Orleans, O’Reilly arranged for a suitably impressive
ceremony in which, after volleys of cannon fire and a parade of his soldiers, he lowered the
French flag and raised the Spanish.195 This act ended the “government of two heads” and left no
doubt as to the seriousness of the Spanish intent – from that point onward, there would be no
grounds for confusion as to which Royal Majesty owned Louisiana.196
Perhaps O’Reilly’s largest step along the path to unifying the colonial government was
the dissolution of the Superior Council and creation of the Spanish Cabildo in New Orleans on
November 25, 1769. O’Reilly intended to institute the Cabildo system in the colony as soon as
possible, and had minutes of the organization recorded as early as August 18th, when he first
arrived in the city – well before the system was implemented and the body had its first official
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meeting on December 1st, 1769.197 O’Reilly needed the Spanish instrument of law and
governance implemented to phase out the laws and customs of France and usher the Spanish
legal system into the colony.198 The Cabildo also served as a much preferred alternative to the
Superior Council, an administrative and legislative body which had proven itself both ineffective
in governing and dangerous through its members’ involvement in, and the Council’s position as
a French institution during, the Revolt of 1768.
After dissolving the Superior Council O’Reilly began integrating the colony into the
Spanish legal system. He appointed two of the lawyers he had used in the trials of the insurgents:
the prosecutor Felix Del Rey, and Judge Advocate Manuel José de Urrutia to draft the collection
of reforms, regulations and compilations of legal abstracts commonly known as the Code
O’Reilly.199 This code was then made available in both the Spanish and French languages in
order that the citizens could learn their new laws.
O’Reilly realized it was critical that he impart an understanding, if not appreciation, for
Spanish law and custom in the Louisianan subjects if the colony was to be successfully
reconciled to Spanish rule. To that end, and to the end of securing colonial loyalty, O’Reilly
placed five of the wealthier planters who had remained loyal during the rebellion on the Cabildo
as regidores, or councilors.200 A sixth seat went to Denis Braud, the French printer who had
gone to trial for his printing of the memoirs of the Superior Council.201 This integration of
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interested and respected locals, he hoped, would help to attach the new government to the people
it governed and place governance in the trust of respectable people who had a vested tie to the
welfare of the colony through the value of their personal property.
Lieutenant General Alejandro O’Reilly turned over the administration of Louisiana to
Governor Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga December 1st, 1769.202 Having effectively put down the
rebellion, and restored order to the colony in his time there, O’Reilly left Louisiana with
distinction. His blend of the threat of overwhelming military force, judiciously used punishment,
amnesty, and meaningful reform could serve as a text on how to effectively pacify collective
political violence. O’Reilly replaced the French laws, official language, commercial policies and
administrative forms – cutting Louisiana’s ties to France significantly, if not completely. This
was reinforced by the introduction of Spanish as the official language, as well as the pomp and
ceremony that O’Reilly used to solidify the Spanish regime as legitimate. He used selective
punishment and forgiveness as well as incorporating the local elite into the Spanish
governmental system to effectively isolate and criminalize the rebel faction – turning the basis
for revolt back from the collective to the personal.
His legal and commercial reforms energized the colonial economy, alleviating that as a
source of discontent. 203 It is important to note that these changes were made with a large degree
of transparency allowing the colonists to see how Spanish rule benefitted them – a marked
change from the quiet work of Governor Ulloa. The increased budget from Spain that O’Reilly
took with him also acted to lessen the discomfort and fears of the populace of Louisiana.
Finally, the considerable military force he left behind provided a deterrent to further incidents of
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rebellion. This is not to say that French sympathy, and a certain degree of distrust of the
Spaniards, was not left in the colony. After the poor start with Governor Ulloa, and the
rebellion, neither Spaniard nor creole could entirely trust the other. However, O’Reilly’s mix of
repression through implied force, enforced laws and concession through amnesty and meaningful
reform went a long way toward unifying those two factions within the colony to a peaceful, if not
always completely happy whole.
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CHAPTER III
CARONDELET’S TENUOUS PEACE
The peace and stability brought to Louisiana by Lieutenant O’Reilly would not last for
long. Twenty three years after the rebellion under Ulloa, economic woes, natural disasters,
pressure from the United States, ethnic tension and revolutionary ideologies brought the
possibility of collective political violence to the administration of Francisco Luis Hector, Baron
de Carondelet. Carondelet announced his arrival as military and civil governor of the province
of Louisiana on December 29, 1791.204 The strength of his familial connections and his
command of the French language from his childhood, considered important given the amount of
French still spoken in the colony, may have accounted in part for why he was chosen for the
governorship of Louisiana. 205 Carondelet was also a skilled administrator who had through
“ability and unremitting exertions and zeal, risen to rank and importance in the service of
Spain.”206 Despite his qualifications and troubles, Carondelet has received a fair amount of
criticism as a colonial leader.
The historiography on colonial Spanish Louisiana largely castigates Carondelet for
overreacting to the threat of revolution and damaging the diplomatic position of Spain versus the
United States (especially with regards to his Indian policies).207 Arthur P. Whitaker found him
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shortsighted and militaristic. Ernst Liljegren and later Gilbert C. Din criticize Carondelet for
lacking prudence, character, good judgment, and being unable to accurately discern the scope of
the various dangers the colony faced.208 Perhaps to a certain extent this is a just assessment of
him. Baron Carondelet enacted a number of measures meant to save Louisiana for the Spanish
crown, but in the end some of his choices hurt the Spanish effort. In any event, he certainly did
not single handedly save Louisiana for Spain. Ultimately that would have required significant
Spanish support, and the colony did not produce enough to justify the massive expense Spain
would have to have laid out to keep her.
It must be considered that Carondelet did what he could to assuage the populace of his
colony during troubled times by providing them access to necessary staples. Also, it should be
said in his defense that there is ample evidence that Carondelet recognized that economic
dependence and demographic ties were the forces that would pull Louisiana from Spain and to
the United States. However he was limited by his resources and was constantly distracted from
attending to the long-term viability of the colony by immediate threats. One must keep in mind
that for the duration of his stay in Louisiana Baron Carondelet was able to successfully keep a
large degree of control, and though there were periods of unrest, a large scale popular revolt
never broke out in the colony.
Throughout Baron Carondelet’s governorship, Louisiana’s distance from Spain and close
proximity to the United States made the colony difficult to control. Though there were
significant internal threats to security, as well as European intrigues; the colony’s proximity to
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the relatively free Americans was almost always a factor to some degree. Carondelet found a
number of causes to fear for American invasion, or colonial revolt spurred on by American aid.
Particularly in the Kentucky territory and along the Georgia frontier, American settlers looked to
expand into territory claimed by Spain. At the same time ‘Citizen’ Edmund Genet was agitating
(from America) for the French ‘habitants’ of Spanish Louisiana to revolt - promising American
assistance.209 Jacobin propaganda printed in Philadelphia found its way into New Orleans by
ships sailing from American ports. Carondelet’s spies repeatedly advised him that America
might invade, and that his defenses were weak in the north of the colony.210 This pushed him to
try to settle northern or sparse areas of the colony such as New Madrid, Natchez or Nogales, and
make risky alliances with native tribes.211 Especially during the wars with France (1793-1795)
and Great Britain (1796-1808) – when Louisiana needed her more as a trade ally, America was a
powerful force in shaping the nature of Spanish policy.
Despite a lack of commitment to invasion by the American Government (which opposed
any kind of invasion into Spanish Louisiana), there were a number of reasons that Baron
Carondelet believed that an invasion of American frontiersmen very well could be imminent.212
Foremost among those was that occasionally Americans would plan to invade Louisiana. In
1797, Senator William Blount of Tennessee was involved with such an invasion plan. Blount,
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with American frontiersmen, British, and Indian allies, intended to lead a three pronged invasion
into New Madrid, New Orleans and Pensacola.213
As far as Carondelet was concerned, that was neither a new, nor isolated incident.
Among the more important of the earlier invasion threats was Citizen Edmund Charles Genet,
official minister to the United States from the French Republic during 1793. Genet was a loud
and forceful proponent of an American invasion of Louisiana. He wanted to stage such an
invasion alongside a simultaneous revolt of the French habitants. French Foreign Minister Pierre
Lebrun dispatched Citizen Genet to the United States with secret orders to foment rebellion
within Louisiana and to promote American filibusters into the Spanish colonies of Florida and
Louisiana.214 Genet’s ‘secret’ invasion raised the specter of insecurity that haunted Carondelet
for the majority of his term.215
Carondelet’s concern over Genet stemmed in part from a pamphlet that Genet published
in America. This pamphlet, entitled Liberty, Equality. The Freemen of France to their brothers
in Louisiana: 2d year of the French Republic, compares the economic misfortune of the
Louisiana colony under the Spanish regime to the success of the free men in the “province of
Kentucky… rapidly increasing its population and wealth, and already presaging a prosperity
which causes the Spanish government to tremble.”216 Thus establishing the reasons for a
justified ire with the Spanish regime, the pamphlet moves on to prompt immediate action, calling
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on the French ‘habitants’ to remember their mother country and be ready to rise against the
Spaniards. Lest they be afraid for the success of his cause, Genet promises “that the republicans
of the western portion of the United States are ready to come down the Ohio and Mississippi in
company with a considerable number of French republicans, and rush to your assistance under
the banners of France and liberty”.217
In broad strokes, Genet’s pamphlet encapsulated the entirety of Carondelet’s problems. It
not only trumpeted the threat of American invasion (though that invasion never materialized); it
also showed that the highly regulated Spanish colonial system was perceived to be stagnant when
compared to the free system of the United States’ frontier. This was exactly the kind of
ideological hook that could catch hold with the discontented and spark another revolt among the
French “habitants”.
Alongside the appearance of the pamphlet were reports from Spanish spies that Genet
was massing a small army of Americans to march into Louisiana. These reports indicated
additional reasons that Genet was providing to the discontented on the American side of the
frontier.218 Throughout April of 1794 Carondelet wrote secret letters to the Captain General of
Cuba, Don Louis de las Casas alerting him to the creation of a French army in America, led by
“Jorge Clark Commander-in-chief of the French against the upper settlements of Luisiana”;
Jorge Clark was the American General George Rogers Clark.219 Carondelet included with this
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letter a translation of Clark’s proposal offering men who would fight with him at least one
thousand acres of land. The stated purposes of the invasion were “a reduction of the Spanish
posts of the Mississippi, for the purpose of opening the navigation and commerce of said River,
and giving liberty to its inhabitants”.220 These reports gave Carondelet a plausible motive for a
Franco-American alliance – navigation of the Mississippi (America) and liberty for the French
inhabitants of Louisiana (France). Sent alongside that report was a translation of a report given
by a Chickasaw chieftain, Ugula Yucabe. That translation reports a massing of white men, either
Americans or Frenchmen, who were constructing boats to carry men and pieces of artillery down
the Mississippi river to New Orleans.221
The shared border between Spanish Louisiana and the United States acted to erode
Spanish authority, economic importance, and cultural cohesiveness in much the same way that
the Spanish/British border did in the 1760’s. Throughout the 1790’s the United States gained a
significant advantage over Spain in terms of trade, immigration, lands gained through diplomatic
concessions, and economic dependence. Importantly, the Spaniards were not as successful as the
United States in recruiting and securing the loyalties of the frontiersmen. To use A.P.
Whitaker’s terminology, Spain and the United States were waging a war of incorporation along
the frontier borderlands, and the United States was winning.222 That is, the Spanish colonial
model could not withstand direct competition with the more robust model of trade and expansion
fostered by the Americans. Carondelet’s administration – a remote arm of a distant centralized
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power, Spain, could not compete with America - a local and decentralized (thus more flexible)
power.223
The American threat to Spanish colonial Louisiana was not just a military, or ideological
one, it was a demographic and economic one. Baron Carondelet recognized this. However,
whether he was focused on military defenses or civil administration, he did not have the means
to turn that tide. In fact it seems that many of the short term measures necessary to keep the
peace served to strengthen Louisiana’s reliance on Americans and thus pull her away from
Spain. This reliance on the nearby foreign power only served to exacerbate other problems of
control which Carondelet’s administration routinely encountered.
While not as significant a split as that between the French and Spanish populations of
Louisiana, an “internal border” was developing in Louisiana between the Spanish, habitant, and
American settlers. By the time of Carondelet’s governorship, the Louisiana colony had already
absorbed a number of American immigrants. Prior to Carondelet, Governor Miro instituted a
generous immigration policy designed to bring Americans into Louisiana, “Hispanize” them,
convert them to Catholicism and secure their allegiance to Spain, such that they would defend
her even against other Americans.224 Miro’s immigration policies saw initial success. The rate
of increase threatened to overwhelm the existing free population of the colony. Americans made
up a large number of the white immigrants who entered Louisiana between the years 1782 and
1792. According to David Weber’s numbers, American immigrants into the colony “helped
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swell its population from some 20,000 in 1782 to 45,000 a decade later.”225 Immigrants from
that period would have accounted for half the population of the colony by 1792. However that
growth would not last. By 1803, the population of the colony had grown only by another 5,000
persons.226
By the mid 1790’s Miro’s plan was failing for a number of reasons. Miro’s immigration
plan required a relatively peaceful period to concentrate the energies of the state on importing
and converting the Americans.227 Spain did not enjoy any such period of peace for long during
Carondelet’s term. Furthermore American immigrants had a tendency not to assimilate to
Spanish rule. This again, as in the 1760s, created an “internal border” of ethnic allegiances
within the colony. While recognizing that colonists leaving the American western frontier would
weaken the United States, Carondelet distrusted the new American immigrants, whom he
considered to be republicans. Early in his administration he acted to curtail the rather generous
immigration policies of Governor Miro.228
Carondelet’s writings show ample evidence that during the first few years of his rule he
believed that American immigrants posed a significant threat, not in their strength of arms, but in
the rapidity with which they settled, and the virulence of their ideas. In the aforementioned
report to the Duke de la Alcudia, dated November 24, 1794, he refers to them as a “vast and
restless population, progressively driving the Indian tribes before them and upon us, seek[ing] to
possess themselves of all the vast regions which the Indians occupy between the Ohio and
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Misisipi [sic] rivers, the Gulf of Mexico and the Apalache mountains”.229 Once the Americans
were allowed to cross the Mississippi and Missouri rivers they would spread colonies throughout
the Spanish holdings, enticing Spanish subjects into disloyalty by “offering them their help and
protection for the securing of independence, self-government and self-taxation”.230 If they are
allowed to spread into Louisiana, American frontiersmen “will flatter them [the inhabitants] with
the spirit of liberty, [and] the hope of free, extensive and lucrative commerce”.231 Carondelet’s
eventual restrictions on written materials coming from abroad show that he also recognized that
American (and French) cultural contact was a threat to the colony. Carondelet feared that
contact with Americans would breed fervor for liberty, and that contact with the French would
renew old ties. In both instances the “Spanish” character of the colony, and thus Spain’s hold on
her, would be lessened by the other influences and the potential for political unrest would
increase.232
In addition to border tension and distance from Spain, Louisiana suffered from a number
of economic troubles – many similar to those of the 1760’s. Parts of the colony could not be
considered self sufficient. Food scarcity continued to be a problem that plagued Carondelet
throughout his term as governor, just as it had the governors before him and would the governors
after. Under the administration of Bernardo de Galvez, the rarity of food caused a Cedula to be
passed in 1782 which allowed trade to the United States for flour and supplies, and lessened the
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trade restrictions with France.233 That opening of trade to Americans made Baron Carondelet
quite nervous because he feared that American spies would make use of the freedom of travel in
the province, as alleged spy Don Midad Mitchel did in 1793. 234 Even more than American
spies, Carondelet feared that rumors were true that such trade with Americans would give slaves
an opportunity to escape to America, where they would be given freedom and that specie would
be traded out of the province.
Another issue for Carondelet was the perpetual scarcity of money backed by precious
metals. The desire to keep what little coin was in the colony was so great that exportation of
specie from New Orleans was, in fact, illegal except when it was used as payment for slaves.235
From time to time the colonial administration introduced paper money as a stop-gap substitute in
order that some form of currency would be available for trade. Traders valued such paper money
very little compared to specie and would avoid using it when they could do so. There are letters
by the trader Juan Batista McCarty in 1784 noting that the cost of flour or African slaves doubled
when they were purchased with paper money. He further asserted that there was no reason to
accept paper currency. McCarty advised accepting bills of exchange to be honored at the
treasury at Vera Cruz rather than deal with any non-specie backed currency from Louisiana.236
Such paper money issuances led to rampant inflation. In 1791 there was a petition to the
Cabildo to have the monies allotted to prisons upped by ½ real per day to account for inflation.237
Likewise in April of 1792 bailiffs appointed by the Cabildo complained that their salaries were
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no longer sufficient and were a cause of disrespect, which was impeding their ability to carry out
their duties.238 On June 13th of 1794 the head constable had to request that several cabarets be
opened in order that the fines and taxes from those cabarets pay the salaries for more deputy
constables.239 Many of these cabarets were closed not because of the threat to public order or the
morale and morals of the general population. Rather they were closed because there was a fear
that escaped and rebellious slaves were using the cabarets as black markets to purchase
munitions and liquor at night and successfully avoiding the slave patrols. That these would be
re-opened is a telling indication of both how dire the need for more deputy constables must have
been as well as an indication of a complete lack of money in the colony with which to pay
them.240
A shift in agriculture was part of the economic instability. Planters were replacing indigo
and tobacco with cotton and sugar as the main colonial exports. In the ten years between 1784
and 1793, the production of indigo bound for Europe dropped from 220,000 lbs to less than
5,000 lbs.241 A number of conditions contributed to the decline. Blights, vermin and/or flooding
devastated colonial indigo crops in the years 1793, 1794, and 1796.242 This combined with
decreases in the costs of East Indian indigo, general European preferences for the same, the
increasing costs of slaves – of which a large number were needed for indigo production--
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combined to cement the downward spiral of indigo as a viable commercial crop.243 Baron
Carondelet considered, and attempted, several schemes to incentivise Louisiana indigo but the
market was dropping out from under the crop, which must have made the effort seem some
Louisiana planters to be foolish and thus potentially damaging to the prestige and authority of his
office. 244
Tobacco exports, likewise, saw a huge drop when the Spanish tobacco monopoly stopped
buying in 1790. There were a number of reasons for the collapse of the Louisiana tobacco
market. The quality of Louisiana tobacco was inferior to that of Mexico, Cuba, and the
Caribbean Islands. Planter fraud led to conflicts with Spanish regulators. For example, General
Wilkinson maneuvered to break the Louisiana monopoly of tobacco with Spain, opening Spanish
markets to tobacco from Kentucky. Finally, a building surplus in New Orleans led to a decline
in the demand for new leaf there – reducing the amount purchased by the state monopoly from
2,000,000 lbs. to a mere 40,000 lbs. in 1790.245 Such a relatively rapid decline ruined farmers
who had speculated heavily on tobacco cultivation, betting that the market would keep rising (or
even remain relatively stable). Many who lost big on tobacco correctly blamed the Spanish
commercial policies for their reversed fortunes.
The rise of cotton and sugar as replacement exports took time. Sugar did not really take
off until the mid 1790’s after the proven success of Etienne de Borés granulation process in 1795
and the collapse of the Caribbean sugar plantations of St. Domingue. Early European
monopolies limited the import of sugar to that produced in the Caribbean colonies, thus limiting
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the viability of Louisiana sugar. It was not until the mid 1790’s that many of these restrictions
were lifted, due in part to the Haitian revolution which limited the production of Caribbean sugar
and led to the immigration of many experienced sugar planters from the island to Louisiana.246
However, even after sugar began to replace indigo as a crop there were significant barriers to
sugar planting which prevented many failing indigo planters from making the transition. Sugar
planting required a large initial outlay of capital for the slaves to work the fields, as well as the
equipment and fuel necessary to process the cane (often cords of wood, or, once in operation, the
pressed remnants of unused cane), and the cane shoots themselves.247 This outlay, and the
limited season for sugar growing and production (the available sugar cane varieties would not
stand frost either during growth or before grinding) prevented many planters from making the
indigo to sugar transition.
Cotton was not an effective crop until the mid 1790’s, after the adoption of Eli Whitney’s
cotton gin and the increased immigration of American settlers and slaves into Spanish
Louisiana.248
In sum, the agricultural disruption caused by a shift in the relative value of commercial
crops lead to discontent in city and country alike, as farmers and merchants both suffered under
weight of export crops with shrinking markets – leading to widespread financial insecurity.
Farmers often expressed their discontent “in the form of dissatisfaction from Spanish
rule”, and felt that a French acquisition of the colony would not only allow them to explore

246

Ibid., 444-445.

247

Ibid., 446.

248

Clark, New Orleans 1718-1812, 217.

90

markets denied to them by the Spanish mercantile system, but also absolve them of prior debt
and allow them the freedom to re-tool their plantations to take advantage of sugar or cotton.249
The colony also had to contend with food production that was hardly sufficient to its
needs. John Clark, in New Orleans: An Economic History, 1718-1812, calculated that the
Missouri country produced 38,000 to 45,000 bushels of wheat a year in the 1790’s. This was
enough wheat to generate around 7,000 to 9,000 barrels of flour.250 Of this amount, farmers
would have shipped perhaps half to New Orleans for consumption. Given that New Orleans’
population alone was around 8,000 and the lower valley held between 35,000 to 40,000 souls
during the 1790’s, the amount of flour produced was problematic. That amount of flour was not
nearly enough to satisfy the demands of the city, to say nothing of the rest of the colony.251 Such
shortages created discontent – hunger being a significant impediment to happiness.
War with France prompted the colonial officials to press the king for more trade rights
with America. Previously the province had maintained trade with France, and a stable trade ally
was needed for the colony in order to prevent the colony from running low on critical supplies
and staples, and to ease tensions caused by the sudden loss of trade. During the war with France,
America was considered a ‘Friendly Nation’ to Spain, allowing it to be a trade partner for the
duration of the war under the trade allowances of the edict of June 9th, 1793.252 The supplies
from America came with a cost to the Governor. As mentioned, Carondelet was very suspicious
of potential expansion by American frontiersmen and the increase in trade with America made
Carondelet more nervous about the security of the colony.
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The close attention Spanish officials normally paid to persons and written materials
imported into Louisiana stood in contrast to the rather lax enforcement of shipping laws
concerning the import of foodstuffs. In addition to food shortages, New Orleans was almost
always short of supplies. To satisfy the need for goods, colonial officials were willing to ignore
the entry of smugglers, particularly the smuggling of taxable food into New Orleans.253 In July
of 1791 a Royal Decree pardoned those in the colony accused of smuggling.254 It is likely that
the attachment to (if not outright dependence on) American shipping as the main source of
sustenance of the colony was in the long term a greater problem for Spanish retention of the
colony than republican frenzy spurred on by Jacobin propaganda. That trade created ties to
America; at the same time ties to Spain were weakening through the loss of Spanish trade.
Stronger ties to Spain would have helped prevent discontent from being politicized as it was in
the 1768 revolt. Furthermore, direct external trade to foreign powers also contributed to the
colony being a net loss for Spain. Illegal and duty-free trade out of New Orleans was a financial
blow to the colony. Charles Gayarré demonstrates this deficit by citing “a dispatch of the
Intendant Rendon, dated on the 28th of April, 1795, that the expenses of the province had
amounted in 1794 to $864,126, and that the custom-house revenue had not given more than
$57,506.”255
Devastation from natural disasters as well as man-made disasters deepened the economic
hole that New Orleans, the economic center of the province, was in. On Oct. 10, 1794 Attorney
General Don Juan Bautista Labatut wrote to the king asking for aide to the province. He cited a
number of troubles. Amongst those troubles were: repeated scarcity from war, hurricanes, the
253
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Cuban administration’s confiscation of silver meant for the province, little to no trade to Europe,
poor trade to the United States, and no goods coming from the other Spanish American
colonies.256 On December 19th of that same year, Labatut wrote the king again asking for a loan
of 1,000,000 pesos. He cited the following reasons that the loan was justified: five hurricanes,
floods too numerous to count, two great fires and the sudden withdrawal of paper money. He
claimed that those factors had greatly weakened commercial production, nearly to the point of
destruction, and lead to an imminent threat of mass immigration from the colony.257 Not all of
these great disasters happened during the governorship of Baron Carondelet; however he
certainly had to deal with their effects, particularly the heightening of distress and unrest
amongst the citizens of New Orleans and the colony as a whole that accompanied and followed
economic depression.
To some planters there was an upside to the disasters that plagued the colony. Some
disasters brought the planters and colonial administration to work more closely together. Slaves
were often loaned out to the governor to work in repairing damage caused by natural disasters
such as damage to levees due to flooding.258 Some planters preferred this as a method of
disposing of slaves who were caught committing crimes. Planters could loan their slaves out to
the governor for periods of time, rather than risk losing the investment to deportation.259 This
arrangement, in a way turned the normally stressing condition of natural disasters (at least
hurricanes, and floods) to one that fostered a tighter relationship between the administration and
one of the more important classes of colonists.
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For the most part, however, Louisiana planters preferred to have free reign to run their
plantations and slaves as they saw fit. This preference to run their own affairs, running against
the wary policies of Carondelet, may itself have engendered feelings of resentment that the
Governor may have interpreted as Jacobin leanings. Such resentment of government
interference, as well as observations of the American success to the north, and sympathies to
their French ties may have indeed bred sympathy in some for the Jacobin cause – although that
sympathy would always be tempered by the anti-slavery views espoused by some of the
Jacobins. Baron Carondelet hinted in the 1795 decree that he believed there were enemies of the
crown and his personal political enemies at work undermining his efforts.260 Carondelet believed
these personal enemies to be the French, and Jacobins in the northern part of the Louisiana
province, near Ohio, and along the Mississippi river, men who could not defeat Spain in the
open. He believed they used local sympathizers and agent provocateurs to slander him and claim
that he maneuvered to position slave against master and actively hoped for a slave revolt in order
to spread dissatisfaction with him amongst the habitants.261 That belief was not entirely without
merit.
There were, in 1793, one hundred and fifty subjects of the colony who petitioned the
French government to reclaim Louisiana. In March of that year a delegation of fifty merchants
from New Orleans sent deputies to the French convention with gifts. Rumors circulated that this
same group of men conspired to have Baron Carondelet removed as Governor-General of the
colony.262 These petitions circulated in a period of exuberant popular mania for all things French
which occurred in the city of New Orleans in the early 1790’s. At that time, the colonists
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celebrated their French heritage in a manner which occasionally seemed threatening to the
Spanish governor.263
Carondelet also had to contend with rural discontent. The Natchitoches revolt led by
Father Delvaux is an extreme example of the occasional rural unrest in Carondelet’s Louisiana,
as well as of some weaknesses of the syndic system for maintaining order. Ernest Liljegren’s
take on events holds that Father Jean Delvaux, a parish priest in Natchitoches had as his flock a
number of old French families that had “degenerated” in status during the Spanish rule of
Louisiana.264 Delvaux developed a penchant for negatively commenting on Spanish rule, and
promoting the French. Eventually word of this reached back to New Orleans. For inciting the
populace of Natchitoches to anti-Spanish sentiment, Baron Carondelet requested the replacement
of Delvaux, and the Vicar-General granted the governor’s request. Delvaux’s flock refused to
accept his relocation out of the parish, and when the local syndic, François Bossie, refused to
sign their petition to prevent Delvaux’s removal, Delvaux’s supporters informed him (Bossie)
that they would no longer recognize him as syndic.265 They took to harassing those in the
community that would not sign the petition, and split the town into two opposed factions. One
faction was composed of the supporters of Delvaux, who adopted revolutionary ideology and
agitated in the streets; in the other were the loyal citizens who were largely afraid to leave their
homes.
When Carondelet denied the parishioners’ petition they formed a drunken “Compagnie
des Revenants” and demonstrated against Spanish rule – singing revolutionary songs and loudly
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criticizing both Carondelet and the syndic system.266 In H. Sophie Burton & F. Todd Smith’s
Colonial Natchitoches: A Creole Community on the Louisiana-Texas Frontier, the impetus for
the creation of the Revenants is revealed to be the negative impact that the Spanish cancellation
of Natchitoches’ tobacco contracts had on the young men within the area, rather than republican
teachings by Delvaux – though Burton and Smith do acknowledge that Delvaux was a
contributing factor to the unrest. Many planters in the Natchitoches area were still heavily vested
in tobacco after many other areas left the crop, and suffered a great economic hardship when the
Spanish demand for Louisiana tobacco plummeted in 1790. Many farmers blamed Spanish
officials for this sudden decline in their personal fortunes and the Revenants were a group of
young men expressing their discontent with the economic environment and what they believed to
be Spanish mismanagement of the Louisiana colony.267
Patrols raised by the surrounding syndics did not have the confidence of the area, and
could not maintain control. The Revenants harassed, insulted and beat those with whom they
disagreed with seeming impunity. Even after Carondelet had Delvaux removed he still remained
a source of agitation in the community by writing letters to his supporters urging them to
continue their efforts against Spanish authority and claiming that the French were on their way to
reclaim the colony.268 Fearing for his reputation and that these events would damage the case he
was making for using Louisiana settlers as a barrier between the United States and Mexico,
Carondelet decided to quell the rebellion. On January 14,1794, Captain Antonio Argote of the
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Baton Rouge militia took a company of fifteen men and easily restored order in Nacthitoches ,
with only a few punitive measures taken against the former Revenants.269
The Natchitoches rebellion serves as an example of how local discontent wholly
unrelated to the ideology of the French Revolution borrowed its slogans. Delvaux’s discontent
was personal, or perhaps professional. Economic troubles due to the sudden lack of Spanish
interest in tobacco produced in Natchitoches and the removal of Delvaux caused most of the
discontent felt by his followers.270 Like the 1768 coup, the Natchitoches revolt was directed by a
small, yet influential segment of the local population. And similar to, and even more
exaggerated than the 1768 coup, there was no clear agenda after the removal of the local source
of authority.271 Delvaux simply wished to resist the Spanish authority until the time that the
French arrived.
Historian Ernst Liljegren took Carondelet’s (allegedly wildly exaggerated) reports of the
Nacthitoches demonstrations as proof of wide-scale discontent and political violence. After
examining Liljegren’s sources, historian Gilbert C. Din came to a different conclusion about the
incident. Comparing Carondelet’s reports to his superiors with those to his subordinates led Din
to the conclusion that in many reports to those superiors Carondelet exaggerated the opposition
he faced, perhaps in an attempt to ensure more resources and minimize any possible reprimand
for failure.272 Carondelet’s exaggerated reports led Liljegren to overstate the problems in
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Nacthitoches and the rest of the rural Louisiana countryside as well as Carondelet’s inability to
deal with the problems at hand.273
More than the French military, Baron Carondelet feared French ideological influence.
Carondelet had good reason to fear the spread of Jacobinism in the city of New Orleans as well
as in remote areas such as Natchitoches. In May of 1795 songs defaming him, and calling for the
guillotining of notables within the city, including the governor, were heard at night in the
streets.274 The anthem of the French republic, the ‘Marseillaise’ was played alongside other
Jacobin songs in some theatres.275 At the same time the French phrase ‘Cochon du lait’, meaning
‘suckling pig’, began to see use as a derogatory rhyming slang for Carondelet in the streets of
New Orleans.276 There are mentions in the deliberations of the Cabildo on May 2nd 1795 of
“rumors and calumnies against the person of his lordship”. The rumors complained that
Carondelet purposefully kept the city in a state of defense as a pretense to enforce more draconic
and tyrannical laws against the people, and furthermore that he used methods proscribed by law
to investigate and punish those who insulted the persons who governed. Carondelet vehemently
denied these rumors and vowed to spare no expense to investigate them.277
Arson had gotten to be a problem in New Orleans. Some feared that rebellious slaves
were behind the conflagrations of 1788 and 1792 that burned a large portion of the city.278 In
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1795 arsonists set a series of small fires around the city of New Orleans. These came at the same
time as a resurgence of Jacobin sentiment, expressed through “revolutionary songs…and
incendiary papers” appearing in the city. Jacobin mobs used the fires as gathering places, and
Carondelet feared that attempts to disperse them would instigate violent action.279 For the same
reason he felt that policing such areas was dangerous. This is not to say that he abandoned all
attempts to control the situation; Carondelet posted a reward of 500 pesos to any person who
could provide information leading to the capture of the arsonist or arsonists.280
All of this concern about Jacobinism and Carondolet’s rule came to a head in 1795 during
the months following the April 9th report of a planned slave revolt in Point Coupée. A group of
Point Coupée slaves, perhaps inspired by French republican propaganda originating from France
and Saint Domingue, plotted to revolt and burn their master, Julien Poydras’ estate.281 Once the
fire had started, the slaves planned on ambushing and killing the neighboring planters who would
rush to Poydras’ assistance. The conspirators then would take up the arms of the killed planters
and launch a large revolt, killing both colonial whites and slaves who refused to join their
rebellion.282
Once alerted to the danger, Militia Captian Alejandro LeBlanc reported to his post
commandant Guillermo Duparc and sent a patrol to uncover more information.283 The initial
patrol was not successful in doing so. However, Duparc launched his own defensive measures,
including an increase of armed patrols. Local planters armed themselves in preparation for a
279
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revolt. Not long thereafter two slaves, Juan Batista and María Luisa, provided specific
information regarding the planned slave insurrection. Two Tunica tribeswomen, Francisca and
Magdalena, confirmed their story – fearing that should the slave revolt succeed, they would
suffer retribution alongside the slaves.284 Duparc, with the aid of Lt. William McIntosh, who had
been dispatched with a company of militia to assist, began a thorough search of the slave cabins.
This uncovered more conspirators, and some of their arms. Planters and syndics uncovered the
shocking revelation that there were whites among the Point Coupée conspirators as well.285
Throughout April and into May the numbers of uncovered conspirators grew.
Commandant Duparc began to believe that the conspiracy was an attempt by “indigenous people
amongst the pro-French, anti-Spanish elements of the colony or outside agitators” to either
overthrow the colony or disgrace governor Carondelet.286 By May 15th authorities had arrested
60 conspirators: 57 slaves and 3 whites.287 After a series of trials the conspirators received a
variety of punishments. Advisor to the intendancy Manuel Serrano sentenced twenty three to
twenty six of the slaves to hang.288 Another twenty-two were sentenced to 10 years service in
the presidio system of fortresses. Nine of the slaves received shorter sentences of 5 years in the
presidios. Serrano had one slave and one of the whites banished. The other two whites received
sentences of 6 years presidio duty.289
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During the later stages of the investigation there was some disagreement between
Carondelet and the New Orleans Cabildo over which of them should have handled the matter,
and what actions were to be taken to secure the colony. The Cabildo sent representatives to
Point Coupee to investigate at the same time that Carondelet sent a small military detachment for
the same purpose.290 Carondelet viewed this act with some suspicion. On May 1st, Carondelet
took care to explain his actions to the Cabildo with emphasis on how he strove to secure the
colony. Given that Carondelet wrote, secretly, to Luis de la Casas in Cuba that he believed some
on the Cabildo to be Jacobin sympathizers, the explanation of his actions that he presented to the
Cabildo may have been an attempt to protect his reputation from Jacobin slander in that body.291
Baron Carondelet issued a decree on June 1st encapsulating his thoughts on a variety of
issues as well as a defense of his actions. This decree starts out with Carondelet’s thoughts on
the current political climate: “The astonishing success, with which some disaffected, restless
enthusiasts, have promulgated injurious reports, tending to introduce distrust, and jealousy,
between Government and the habitants, that would inevitably expose the Province to all the
Horrors that have ruined the French Colonies, has engaged us to form Regulations, calculated to
re-establish throughout this Province good order, Police and Public tranquility.”292 This passage
begins to outline the suspicions that Baron Carondelet had that there were conspiracies behind
the social problems in the Province. Slaves were not simply driven into revolt by mere
dissatisfaction with their lives; they were incited by European events. Crimes were not
committed by the hungry and desperate, they were products of propaganda from “restless
enthusiasts”.
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The June 1st decree, which also broadened the role of the syndics, and tightened the
police duties, had a section on slave treatment. Carondelet ordered slave owners to exercise
extreme care over the conduct of their slaves and to make sure that they were kept contented and
subordinate. The stated concern was that the recent war might have put them in a state ready to
be incited to rebellion. The goal was then to “banish from their minds the notion of acquiring a
liberty that has caused the effusion of so much blood to those of St. Domingo.”293 A set of 31
rules and guidelines for the treatment and conduct of slaves followed this declaration. They were
meant to keep the slaves contented enough not to want to rebell, yet not indulged enough to
begin to be tempted to insubordination. The 1795 decree presented again a philosophy of
moderation, and while far more restrictive than was usual before the Pointe Coupee revolt, it still
to a certain extent called for appeasement of the slaves. As such, Carondelet’s policies were still
not the most popular with planters, who openly blamed Carondelet and the lenient slave policies
before the revolt for it.294
Baron Carondelet understood the dire need for defense, security, and measures of control
in Louisiana well before he issued the June 1st decree of 1795. Early in his tenure, he
implemented a number of safety and security measures meant both to reinforce Spanish control
and to protect the colony against the machinations of its enemies: the French, Americans, British,
Jacobins, criminals and rebellious slaves. In October of 1792 he called for the property owning
citizenry of New Orleans to put money together for the purchase of reflectors to be installed on
street lamps. That would have allowed for much better lighting in the city and reduced crime.295
More street lamps, ordered from Philadelphia, arrived in April of 1794. Carondelet instituted a
293
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nine real per annum tax on the chimneys of the city to pay for city lighting. He was concerned
about burdening (or agitating) the poor, and taxing the chimneys would limit the tax to
reasonably wealthy citizens.296 In order to root out any potential spies or agents provocateur
Carondelet made it the law that any immigrants to the colony after 1790 had to swear allegiance
to Spain. Any person who refused to do so had a choice of being deported to the United States
or the Danish Islands.297
Baron Carondelet also tried to be responsive to the complaints and requests of the
subjects.298 In particular, he responded to the feeling of many of the important planters and
merchants that they were being left out of the administration of the colony in favor of outsiders
from Spain. He had already re-introduced the Syndics in 1792. Now, on April the 25th 1794,
Governor Carondelet wrote to the King asking for the appointment of more locals to
judgeships.299 This would not only have given Carondelet more judges under him, but also
would have helped to garner for Carondelet support from the local community by involving more
of the local elite in government.
To the same end, Carondelet, as part of the Decree of 1795, more clearly defined the
roles of the Syndics.300 The Syndics were a French institution in which a series of men were
chosen from the locals, stationed every three leagues or so and asked to act as reporters and
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intermediaries for the post commandants.301 These Syndics were to act as a kind of front men to
the commandant of the district in which they lived. The local habitants were, under threat of
punishment, to report any crime they had knowledge of to the nearest Syndic. They also were to
bring to the attention of the Syndic “all seditious reports, or such as tend to alarm and disturb the
minds of the people…under the penalty of one Hundred Dollars”.302 This move was calculated
not only to reinforce order by creating a tighter network of information, but also (as has been
noted above) to engender in the habitants a sense of belonging to the system by increasing their
involvement in the system. At the same time the Syndic was under orders to report to the
commandant any meeting of eight or more habitants intending “to treat upon Public Affairs.”303
The Syndics thus also acted as informants within the habitant community, introducing an
element of risk to potentially seditious gatherings similar, perhaps, in effect to living in a
panopticon like environment. Syndics were also expected to be agents of information
dissemination in order that the population received trustworthy and controlled information rather
than hearsay and rumor, thus in theory preventing agitating news from spreading and alarming
the habitants.304
Carondelet was keenly aware that information control was about more than preventing
unfavorable rumor and reports from circulating; he knew that he needed to put his own message
out to the people. The reinstituted French Syndic system in part was intended for the
dissemination of “good intelligence” to the people, in order that the populace had the “correct”
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idea of what is going on in the colony.305 But the Baron went further. In March 1794 he
spearheaded the publication of the first newspaper printed in Louisiana. Le Moniteur de la
Louisianne. It began its print run in March of 1794, on Louis Duclot’s New Orleans press and
was unabashedly an organ of Spanish government.306
Carondelet attempted to use these means of information to portray the French revolution
as a disorganized mass mob action, and to suggest that if the revolution spread to the colony it
would be followed by “looting and depradations.” Furthermore he asserted that any French
uprising in the colony would bring about a slave revolt like the one that had occurred in Saint
Domingue. Early in his reign this propaganda was largely successful and fear of slave revolt
helped to sway the large planters against openly supporting revolution. Those planters feared at
first that the slaves would be set free by the French government following a successful transition
of the colony, and this kept them loyal to the Spanish government to an extent. 307
Another component to Carondelet’s ideological defense planning was screening traffic to
keep out propaganda materials, spies, and provocateurs. Particularly after the slave revolts in St.
Domingue, Carondelet was fearful of outside agitators in Louisiana. This fear was based on “the
astonishing success with which some disaffected restless enthusiasts have promulgated injurious
reports tending to introduce distrust and jealousy between government and the inhabitants that
would inevitably expose the province to all the horrors that have ruined the French colonies”.308
Even before the slave unrest, with circulars like Genet’s “Liberty, Equality” pamphlet,
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Carondelet found ready cause to blame unrest on outside factors; perhaps distracting him from
legitimate internal failings, which if corrected might have contributed to the success of the
colony.309
Another major issue Carondelet had to face was the importation and conduct of slaves.
Since the August 22nd, 1791, revolt in St. Domingue, many in Louisiana, including Carondelet,
justifiably feared a slave revolt occurring in the colony – spread to Louisiana by the importation
of African slaves “tainted” in the French islands by revolutionary thought or brought by the
house slaves of fleeing Haitian planters.310 To prevent such a revolt from occurring in Louisiana,
he felt it was necessary to enforce the Spanish slave system as it was written – which would
prevent slaves from becoming desperate enough to revolt. In doing so he constantly struggled
against the planter class, including some members of the Cabildo, who felt that he was intruding
too often in the affairs of the planters and their treatment of their property.311 The large planters
did not appreciate this meddling. Many of them resented the relatively lax slave codes of the
Spaniards, and longed for the older French code.312 Others objected to the myriad requirements
of the Royal Cedula on the Education, Treatment, and Occupations of Slaves passed in 1789, and
felt that they would be ruined by the expense of keeping up with them.313 Almost all of the
planters resented the intrusion of the Spanish governor into the social structure of the plantation
on behalf of slaves – that kind of meddling lost the master of the plantation a certain degree of
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autonomy, status, and upset “the symbolic relationship of planters and their families to the slaves
themselves.”314
As much as the planters feared an increase in the expense of maintaining slaves, they also
feared that the importation of slaves would be restricted. Restricted importation would mean a
limitation on their ability to grow their businesses and profites. Those fears were completely
justified. Over the course of Carondelet’s reign as governor, he placed numerous and repeated
restrictions on the importation of slaves.
Carondelet announced his bando de buen gobeirno (proclamation of good government)
on January 22nd of 1792. One of the proscriptions of the bando prevented the importation of
Caribbean slaves in order to prevent potential contact with slaves who may have had exposure to
the revolutionary ideas of the French West Indies or Jamaica.315 Within three years, this part of
the decree ceased to be observed and the year 1795 saw a marked increase in imported slaves.316
So on February 19, 1796 Baron Carondelet again temporarily banned the introduction of slaves
into the colony being “neither Spanish nor foreign”.317 On February 22nd of that same year, the
Attorney General of the Cabildo, along with the Secretary, inspected a ship with a cargo of fifty
Africans that was at the harbor. They went to test the Africans on board for “savagery,” – that is
still “native” in appearance and mannerisms-- and if they showed any sign of not being savage
then the shipment was to be refused.318 The implication here is that it was not the savagery, or a
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supposed base nature of the African that was feared but evidence of contact with rebellious
slaves or exposure to the ideology of freedom.
Bans on the importation of Africans limiting import to only the “savage” or “brute”
periodically recur. There are reports in the Cabildo records on July 16th, 1792 of suspicion of the
introduction of African slaves from Guarico in violation of the February 10th laws forbidding any
but “brutes” to be brought in. Similarly there was a motion put forward in the Cabildo to ban the
introduction of Africans from any place where there had been a revolt. The resulting ban
prevented the importation of some slaves that were already on ships at New Orleans, causing
considerable loss to the slave trader involved. Indeed the financial risk of importing slaves into
the colony could be quite high. The penalty the Cabildo proposed for the importation of
undesirable slaves was a 200 pesos fine as well as the cost of returning the slaves to their point of
origin, and of course, the acceptance of responsibility for any damage or detriment caused by the
slaves.319
June 20 of 1795, the Cabildo discussed the possibility of blocking the importation of
slaves into the colony who were not completely illiterate for the duration of the war with
France.320 The fear seems to be that there would be a spread of revolutionary propaganda to
slaves as the new imports were introduced into the slave populations of the colony’s plantations.
In short, any literate slaves were being viewed as potential carriers of an infectious revolutionary
sentiment in much the same way that slaves from the Caribbean islands where slave revolts took
place were.
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The value that the slaves had for the merchants and planters was a mitigating factor in
how far the restriction on slave importation was enforceable. Planters were able to, and
frequently did, petition to have the embargo lifted for them. These cases were examined by
members of the Cabildo under orders of the governor, reported on, and accepted or denied. For
example, on June 17, 1796, Don Alejandro Baudin petitioned to import so-called “savage
negroes”. His grounds were that Baron Carondelet had allowed certain individuals to do the
same on January 1st of 1796, and as Spain was no longer at war with France, there would be little
risk in allowing him to do so as well. Attorney General Gabriel Fonvergne argued against the
petition. In his words “peace with the republic of France neither diminishes nor removes the
dangers when the criminal intention of negroes is not destroyed and annihilated.” The petition
was judged to be “against the interests of the King and colony.”321
Carondelet did not stop his reforms with restrictions on the importation of slaves. He
also sought to move the colony into compliance with newer Spanish laws governing the
treatment of slaves. The slave laws of prior administrations – based on the French Code Noir were less restrictive to the planters than Carondelet’s new regulations. His deviation from the
French laws proved the basis for some of the resentment he suffered at the hands of the New
Orleans planters and merchants.
There were two major sets of laws that formed the Spanish policy during the colonial
administrations before Carondelet’s: the Recopilacion de leyes de los reynos de las Indias
(Summary of the Laws of the Governance of the Indians)322 and the Real Cedula de su majestad
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sobre la educacion, trato y ocupaciones de los esclavos (His Majesty’s Royal Decree on the
Education, Treatment, and Work of the Slaves).323
The Code Noir, as it was practiced in French Louisiana, was to the slave, in many ways a
harsher and more restrictive system with fewer protections than the systems introduced later by
the Spaniards.324 Under French rule, the authorities only enforced those sections of the code that
were found favorable by the large planters. One example of this is that while the Code Noir
technically allowed the freeing of slaves with permission of the Superior Council, in practice the
Superior Council rarely gave permission to any planter seeking to free a slave, and there was no
incentive under the code for a planter to do so. Thus the Code Noir stood in stark contrast to the
Spanish system of slave management with regard to manumission – a component the Spaniards
felt was necessary as a “safety valve” to allow slaves the hope of freedom and thus reduce the
chance of slave revolt. Slaves could purchase their own freedom if they had the money and a
record of good conduct.325 Another example of the relative restrictiveness of the Code Noir, is
that while the slave had the right to complain against his/her master under the Code, it forbade a
slave’s testimony against the master, which rendered that complaint practically useless.326 Nor
was education of slaves (religious or otherwise) a concern of the typical French Louisiana
planter, though religious indoctrination was given lip service in the Code. The Spanish system
was, again in theory, much more lenient to the slaves.
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However, the implementation of the Spanish laws of slave ownership was not immediate
when the Spaniards gained control of the colony. The planters operated more or less under the
Code Noir until Alejandro O’Reilly began attempting to enforce the laws of Castille, the
Recopilacion de leyes de los reynos de las Indias.327 The Spanish system recognized that slaves
possessed identities within the law, as opposed to being mere property. Therefore the Spanish
slave laws provided many more rights to slaves, including a process for coarticion (self
purchase).328
While O’Reilly was keen to bring the French planters into compliance with the Spanish
slavery laws, his successors were not effective at doing so for a number of reasons. In the earlier
years of the Spanish regime, remaining relatively lax on slave regulation was a necessary step.
The French habitants already feared a tight and controlling Spanish rule, and the local
administrators did not need planters agitating again for retrocession or revolt.329 Because of that
laxness, the planters became more entrenched in their own customary methods of slave control.
Also the Spaniards, even at the height of their military presence in the colony, simply did not
have the resources and manpower to properly police the plantations for violations of the slave
laws. Furthermore, the plantation owners were the elite of the colony. The Spanish regime
needed their cooperation if not their consent to govern effectively. This need for the cooperation
of the planters continued to inhibit the strict enforcement of slave laws until the administration of
Carondelet. Carondelet’s fear of rebellion caused him to risk alienating the large planters by
meddling more directly and persistently in their affairs. Moreover, he had new legislation on
slave rights to guide him.
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In 1789 king Carlos IV of Spain issued the Real Cedula de su majestad sobre la
educacion, trato y ocupaciones de los esclavos, superseding the Recopilacion de leyes de los
reynos de las Indias.330 This decree dictated that the plantation owners provide chaplains for
their slaves, permit slaves to marry, and allow them days of rest on holy days. The decree also
allowed slaves recourse against abusive masters. They could file claims against them with the
governor of the colony who would come to judgment and potentially enforce a settlement of
some kind.331
The Real Cedula arrived in Louisiana by 1790, but was not strictly enforced for some
time. One reason that it wasn’t immediately enforced was a fear at that time that strict
enforcement would drive the planters to yearn for the “old ways” and sympathize more with the
French, eventually causing problems in the colony. As a measure to prevent this kind of
thinking, in the early years of the French revolution the Spanish administration played on the
planters’ fears that the revolution, if it spread to the colony, would cause the slaves to rise up.332
The planters needed the assistance of the Spanish government to control the slaves and prevent a
slave revolt. To a large degree that was effective and the large planters became valuable allies in
governing the populace.
However, in 1791 Baron Carondelet, contrary to the practices of his predecessor Esteban
Rodriguez Miro, began to enforce the Cedula.333 The planters of Louisiana were uncomfortable
with the requirements of the Cedula and wrote letters asking for it to be rescinded. They argued
that the new regulations were a danger and would encourage slaves to file false claims against
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their masters. Furthermore they argued that the costs of providing chaplains for the slaves would
be prohibitive, as would requirements that male and female slaves be segregated from each other
unless they were married. Planters also contended that the idleness of slaves on the rest days
allotted in the Cedula was a danger, as hard work left the slaves too fatigued to conspire against
them.334
Planters and peers on the Cabildo attempted to influence Carondelet to believe that the
slaves were constantly threatening to revolt. The influence of the planters heightened his fear of
rebellion, but did not immediately sway him to their way of thinking on the issue. Thus the
goodwill between Carondelet and the planters was damaged by what they viewed as his insistent
and dangerous leniency toward the slaves.335 Carondelet was cognizant of the coolness in
relations between the government and the planter class, and had cause to fear that some of the
habitant planters might have been driven to sympathize with American adventurers, or the
republican French. However, regardless of any attempt to sway him to their point of view, and
the threat of driving his old allies to become new enemies, until 1795 Carondelet remained
determined to provide the slaves the rights granted to them by Spanish law. Carondelet did not
oppose the planters out of altruism, but because he felt that more complacent slaves would be
less likely to revolt. The Point Coupee slave rebellion of 1795 changed his mind about that. In
the aftermath of the Point Coupee rebellion he cracked down heavily on slave rights and
freedoms.336 However this reversal of position did not re-endear him to the large planters, many
of whom blamed him for the unrest.
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After the 1795 slave revolts at Point Coupee, Carondelet believed, perhaps even more
strongly, that he was besieged by “enemies of Spain” who “desperate because they could not
defeat [Spain] in open in Ohio and along the Mississippi river mouth…slander Carondelet and
claims he keeps slaves against master and wants a slave revolt.”337 While the propaganda in
question may not have necessarily been American it would most likely travel from an American
port – entering the Louisiana colony either down the Mississippi River or from Philadelphia into
the port of New Orleans. Thus it appeared to the Spaniards that the mode of entry, if not the
origin of the materials, made the propaganda problem at least in part an American one. Because
this was the case, Baron Carondelet knew he had to control the American border to effectively
control his populace. The baron also recognized a need for internal controls, as has been noted.
Carondelet restricted travel and required visitors to check in with local commandants,
receiving passports to travel on. Travelers would be stopped on the roads and if they did not
have the appropriate passports for themselves, their transport and their servants they could face
arrest and interrogation.338 Spanish travel restrictions were infamous to the point that when one
American traveler experienced a journey with few troubles, he found the event noteworthy
enough to write a letter for publication in a newspaper.339 Ships, likewise, were searched for
printed materials which may have been against the interests of the crown. Such a search brought
the arrest of Thomas Mitchell, who possessing drawings of the Mississippi, was suspected of
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being a spy and sent back to Spain – but only after Baron Carondelet gave consideration as to
whether or not Mitchell could be used as a Spanish agent. 340
These restrictions were not without some cost. The reinstitution of the old French syndic
system and the strict control of travel must have served as a reminder of the restrictions that
living under a monarchy imposed. This may have chafed the sensibilities of the relatively liberal
French colonists in New Orleans, as well as potentially discouraging the immigrants that
Carondelet eventually wished to lure from the relative freedom of America.
Perhaps the key step Carondelet took to limiting revolutionary zeal was to play up the
fear of slave revolt. Carondelet made efforts to convince the planter class that once the
revolutionary spirit was spread amongst the white citizenry, it would catch on with the slaves and
cause a bloody uprising.341 By alienating a majority of the planters from the more radical
merchant class of New Orleans, Carondelet kept the French ‘habitants’ from consolidating a
power block which could be used against him. By the time of the 1795 Pointe Coupee revolt,
fears of slave revolt had largely convinced the planters to fear, rather than sympathize with
Jacobin demonstrators.
Carondelet was capable of shrewd displays of force as well. On April 5th 1793, there is
mention in the Cabildo records of an order forcing the Butchers of New Orleans to move their
slaughterhouses away from their then current position on the outskirts of the city to make way
for new fortifications.342 Those new fortifications must also have been a reminder to those living
in the city of Spanish authority. The same order also called for the forest around New Orleans to
340
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be cleared. This would allow the cannon that were to be placed in the new fortifications to fire
on open ground. As an added benefit the removal of the woods would take away a hiding place
from the “savage negroes” and “men of bad character” who were thought to congregate there at
night.343 The clearing of the woods around New Orleans would also allow for better defense of
the city against an Indian, American or the French invasion, thus easing tensions by removing
sources of unease and doubt about the effectiveness of the Spanish protection of the colony.
Defensive measures against the French were of particular importance to Carondelet
because since the French Revolution rumor of French retrocession travelled through the
colony.344 The outbreak of war with France was announced in June of 1793, shortly after the
Baron’s appointment, along with a notice that it was expected of the citizenry of the city to
contribute to Spain’s efforts to defend and secure the colony.345 Following the declaration, in
July, Carondelet ordered the Cabildo’s administrative staff to attend masses for the success of the
King’s army to be held on Sunday, August 11th, arguably in part as a display of public loyalty,
and ritual reassurance of belonging for the people. 346
Native tribes played an active part in Carondelet’s plans to harden the border between
Spain and the United States. In a letter of 1795 to Don Louis de las Casas, Baron Carondelet
directly cites the assemblage of a force to invade Louisiana by “Monsieur Genet” as his reason
for seeking an alliance with the Osage Indians.347 Such an alliance would prevent Genet and
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Clark from using the 1,200 Osage warriors against Spain as well as provide those warriors for
Spain’s use against invading Americans.348 Building such Indian alliances was central to
Carondelet’s plan for the defense of Louisiana. On his eastern frontier, Carondelet actively
courted Indian tribes both to build a buffer between Louisiana and to counter American Indian
agents.349 In October 1793, He called together the Choctaw, Creek, Chickasaw and Cherokee to
Nogales to form a defensive alliance – the “Indian confederation”.350 At the time he encouraged
his Indian allies to act aggressively toward the American frontiersmen – keeping them from
moving further toward Spanish holdings.
Though it must have seemed a necessary activity for defense early on, Carondelet’s
Indian alliances eventually came to be recognized as a strategic misstep. Carondelet’s Indian
policy ultimately proved fiscally untenable, as the cost of Indian allies proved too large a drain
on Spanish coffers. By 1794 gifts to Indian allies was costing Spain 55,000 pesos annually, an
amount that was roughly 10% of the annual budget for the colony, and very nearly the equal to
the annual customs house earnings.351 This money could have found other uses to help control
the growing unrest in New Orleans. At the same time the Indian raids that Carondolet’s policy
fostered lessened the ability of Americans to transport goods that were desperately needed in
New Orleans, damaging both the colony’s financial well being and the morale of those in the
city. Finally, Carondelet’s Indian allies also proved to be an embarrassment in diplomacy
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between the United States and Spain. The need Spanish diplomats felt to distance Spain from
aggressive Indian actions may have contributed to the ease of which the US obtained its terms
with the Treaty of San Lorenzo, in 1795.352
Important as he felt they were, Carondelet did not rely entirely on native alliances for
defense. He also recognized the importance of securing the Mississippi River to prevent
contraband as well as any potential transport of invading troops. By 1793, Carondelet, receiving
reports that the Americans would use the Spanish war with France as an opportunity to seize the
Mississippi river, took actions to fortify both the river and the north of the colony.353 A thorough
and revealing summary of his defensive plans can be found in his November 24, 1794 letter to
his excellency Manuel Godoy, the Duke de la Alcudia.354 Carondelet’s plans for securing the
north called for creating a number of new fortifications as well as repairing many of the current
Spanish fortifications along the river. To man these fortifications, he wished to increase the
Spanish defense of the north with at least an extra regiment of soldiers. Carondelet recruited
men from Mexico, though those recruits were unreliable and many deserted. Such was his need
that Carondelet was not above using conscripted prisoners from Cuba to serve in infantry
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regiments along the northern frontier of the colony (usually after those conscripts served time
building fortifications in the south of the colony).355
Carondelet also found the colony’s defenses lacking in the south. In 1792, the total
number of Spanish regular troops in New Orleans was 766 men - 297 from Louisiana and 469
from Havana. During times of stress, Carondelet requested additional troops from Havana. This
was the case in June of 1793 when he used Cuban soldiers to reinforce New Orleans in the face
of rumors that French sympathizers might move against the government. Despite
demonstrations earlier that year, and the recent signing of a petition asking France to retrocede
the colony, the Cuban soldiers helped assure that the June announcement of war with France was
met with little opposition.356
As valuable as his regular troops were, Carondelet recognized that his permanent forces
were not sufficient to defend the city, and so increased the militia in New Orleans.357 He also
raised a kind of auxiliary militia with citizens from “Baton Rouge, Point Coupée, Opelousas,
Feliciana, Galveztown and Attakapas”, who were instructed to be ready to report to New Orleans
within five days of notice. He valued these militias for their knowledge of the local terrain and
communities and skill with guerilla tactics.358 Carondelet may have intended these troops
primarily for defense from external enemies (if Carondelet made such distinctions). Nonetheless
these are characteristics that Claude E. Welch Jr. found highly advantageous to combating
rebellion.
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Carondelet constructed a freshwater fleet to defend the Mississippi river. He organized a
small fleet of gunboats under the command of Captain Pedro Rousseau for that purpose in
January of 1792.359 By 1793, Carondelet grew “His Majesty’s Light Squadron of Galleys” to
include seven galleys, four galiots, and one lancha.360 The largest of these vessels (the Leal)
patrolled the Gulf of Mexico. The next two in terms of size (the Victoria and Louisiana) sailed
the lower river from New Orleans to Nogales. The galleys Filipa, Vengenza and Castilla were
deployed to the upper Mississippi. The lancha (launch) el Reyo patrolled near the mouth of the
Ohio. Of the three galliots (Flecha, Activa and Vigilante), the Vigilante served as Carondelet’s
personal transportation.361 The squadron served to adequately control access to the Mississippi,
and served as a means of troop transport, but at a cost.362 None of this could be done without
significant expense to Spain for the sake of a colony that was not producing a tremendous return
on the investment.
Despite Carondelet’s measures, he could not keep Jacobin propaganda from spreading.
Jacobin songs, like La Marseillaise, became popular in the streets of New Orleans and cabarets
there were ordered closed to keep order and limit Jacobin demonstration (at the expense of lost
license revenue and taxes).363 This Jacobin sentiment seemed to feed a number of
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demonstrations in the colony.364 Carondelet, recognizing that a display of authority was needed
to keep order in the city, requested help. In November 1793, to pacify the crowds of
discontented that demonstrated in New Orleans, Baron Carondelet called upon Governor Gayoso
de Lemos of Natchez to send him aid. Governor Gayoso sent 300 Anglo-American monarchists
who had immigrated to Spanish Louisiana after the American Revolution. Lilijegren attributes
Carondelet’s ability to maintain order in late 1793 and early 1794 to these “Tory Volunteers”.365
In some ways the sparse population of the colony helped to contain radical sentiment. The effect
distance had on containing rebellion should have been heightened under the Syndic system when
news of disturbances in other parts of the colony had to travel through official channels which
were not adverse to censorship and propagandizing news – though such an effect would be
extremely difficult to prove with evidence.
Wars with Britain and France, as well as the specter of slave revolt or invasion of
“Kentuckians,” hindered Baron Carondelet attempts to resolve a number of important local
sources of discontent. So too did the turbulent economy of Louisiana, which fell even further
into decline during the years between the fall of indigo and tobacco exports from the colony and
the rise of sugar and cotton.366 But Carondelet did not let these problems prevent him from
seeing to matters of local control. Carondelet actively pursued measures such as slave reform,
enhancement of security, inclusion of locals into the government and a propaganda program to
ensure the safety of the colony, and its viability to Spain through physical force, regulation, and
information control.
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CONCLUSION
Looking at the rebellions under Ulloa and Carondelet through the lens of Claude E.
Welch Jr.’s model of popular collective action one is able to see threads of continuity between
the two. Many of the physical setting requirements for popular discontent were present in the
colony, from geographic marginality caused by distance from Spain and frequent opportunity to
natural disasters, and the shifts in methods of production and transport of commercial and
agricultural goods that occurred during the Spanish transition. Social and economic tensions,
exacerbated by a minority and alien rule led in both instances to a tighter sense of both
perceived inequality and self ascription for the “indigenous groups”, be they the original French
and German colonists, Afro-creole slaves or American immigrants.
Both administrations had to contend with the physical distance of Louisiana from the
mother country. The colony lay some 4,500 miles from even the southern Spanish ports.
Louisiana was only 700 miles away from the large Spanish colonial center at Havana, but even at
that distance the journey across the Gulf could take weeks and was fraught with dangers of storm
and attack from privateers. Governor Ulloa found this distance to be more of a factor because he
did not possess enough resources in terms of money or manpower to install himself in New
Orleans as a suitable surrogate presence (in terms of majesty, or authority) for the Spanish
crown. Even after O’Reilly more firmly established Spanish law and authority in the colony,
turning New Orleans into a colonial administrative center in its own right, distance from the
support and guidance of the Spanish court remained a problem. Delay waiting for orders from
the central government lessened the habitants’ perception of Spanish authority.
In addition to the remoteness of the colony, Louisiana also suffered from relatively
inhospitable terrain, which acted to separate the settlement into dispersed locations, favorable for
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agriculture or trade. The terrain also hindered the kind of rapid transit that would be necessary
for patrolling the land and keeping order. Hurricanes, outbreaks of Yellow Fever, and years of
poor conditions for the growing of food staples created or complicated many of the colony’s
other problems. Those disasters also helped to foster the appearance that the Spanish
government was unwilling, or incapable of protecting the citizens.
From the perspective of the Spanish crown, Louisiana’s proximity to British colonies,
later the United States, and its close cultural and periodically economic ties with France also
proved to be a problem in terms of colonial management. The porous borders of the colony led
to an endemic weakening of Spanish authority there, as laws meant to control the border had to
be modified, or in some instances could not be enforced at all. The constant interaction with
foreigners also contributed to a sense of independence and prevented the creation of any kind of
Spanish cultural hegemony in the colony. Methods to control the borders, whether Ulloa’s
attempts to settle Acadian immigrants near the British border or Carondelet’s formation of the so
called “Indian Confederation” and the Mississippi River forts and patrol fleet led to economic
and public relations strains. These strains furthered the social tensions within the colony. When
judgment compelled the respective governors to abandon those programs, colonists perceived the
abandonment as a potential weakness of the administration. This was particularly evident under
both the administrations of Ulloa and Carondelet when they attempted, and to varying degrees
failed, to limit smuggling operations on the Mississippi river.
Not all of Welch’s physical factors were issues for all the Spanish administrations. Land
scarcity was not a large problem; however, one is able to see resource scarcity. Also, when
considering slavery as a means of production, the limitation on slave imports effectively limited
the use of land. This was felt particularly strongly under Governor Carondelet’s administration
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when he restricted (though never halted) slave imports. Likewise, the limits on trade put a
hindrance on the ability of German and Acadian farmers to profit from their lands through
foreign export during Ulloa’s administration. In a similar vein, the trade restrictions limited the
amount of food and staple goods able to reach the colony. In a relatively isolated colony, subject
to frequent disaster, artificial limitations on the citizens’ available food were not popular.
Capitalization of agriculture was not an issue because the agricultural system was already
commercialized to an extent. Louisiana farmers practiced a mixture of subsistence and
commercial farming. Therefore the loosening of social ties that Welch claims accompanies the
capitalization of agriculture had already taken place to a degree.
Given the relative dominance of entrenched French society in the Superior Council,
military, and all other governmental forms, it is hard to see perceived inequality being a factor in
the 1768 revolt. Yet for the Acadian or German farmer, positioned away from the colonial
center of New Orleans, it may have indeed seemed so. Given that there were so few Spaniards in
the colony with whom to compare, it would have been easy to claim that they would be immune
to the hardships suffered by others, especially because the most visible Spaniards were officials.
Some members of New Orleans high society saw Governor Ulloa’s trips to Balize as elitist.
Likewise, in the 1790’s there was no real system of formalized material or status inequality
between the colonial government and the elite citizens, though increased opportunities allowed
officials (and elites) access to greater material goods and comforts. However anti-monarchical
language had made its way to the street of New Orleans, infecting the rioters there with a general
sense of somehow being aggrieved by the Spanish monarchy.
The same strands of Francophile ethnic ascription played a large role in the revolts under
Governor Ulloa and Governor Carondelet. This ascription is evident in the appeals to the French

124

government to take the colony back from Spain which occurred in both periods. The colonists
showed French ascription through displays of French culture. In 1768 the rebels bonded around
the “good wine of Bordeaux”.367 In the 1790’s agitators sung La Marseillaise in the streets. In
the 1760’s, the Germans and Acadians had their own ethnic ascriptions and traditions of
independence, but they were pulled into ascribing with the French Creoles through economic and
social ties – perhaps in the process adopting the larger ascription of “Louisianan.” Those same
social and economic ties existed between the merchants and planters who opposed Carondelet.
The demand for a return to the French “laissez faire” system united the rebels.
The coming of the Spaniards in 1766 began a strain on the French influenced social order
of the colony. New regulations meant a shift in the established commercial patterns that the
social hierarchy relied upon for their position and status. Likewise the threat of implementing
Spanish governmental systems hung over the head of those sitting in the Superior Council.
However, that danger must have seemed far off, given the glacial pace at which Spain was
moving to establish its presence in the colony. This presented to the discontented a window of
opportunity to prevent looming detrimental social change. By the 1790’s the Spanish
governmental system was well established – O’Reilly’s governmental changes saw to that -- and
social change due to Spanish rule should not have been a threat. However economic and
regulatory changes provided the potential for social change and social friction.
Years of colonial neglect had already preconditioned the Louisianans to independence,
and a certain amount of disrespect for strong authority. The same can be said even more so
about the Acadian immigrants, many of whom had resisted the British in Nova Scotia. This
independence, distrust, and even hostility to being governed left the Louisianans a legacy of
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discontent and a strong tradition of resistance. The rampant smuggling, border crossing, and
display of traits which were perceived as indolence, sloth, or recalcitrance give some evidence to
support a more independent atmosphere in the colony.
Even though the 1768 revolt was stopped short by the arrival of O’Reilly, it became a
part of the cultural narrative and indirectly acted to legitimize future acts of rebellion. Thus
Louisianans were in a way primed for resistance before the strong messages of republicanism
coming from French cultural ties in the 1790’s acted to underscore the independence felt in the
colony and prompted the discontented to riot in the streets. Theories of discontent hold that once
a people resort to popular protest, it becomes part of their cultural lexicon and they are likelier to
return to protest in the future.368
This author has discovered no documents explicitly citing the 1768 rebellion as cause,
basis, or justification for the protests of the 1790’s. However a tradition of willingness to resort
to popular protest is revealed somewhat in the repeated attempts of merchants to petition the king
of France for retrocession, first in 1768 and again in 1793. It is shown again through the
constant willingness of the populace to accept smuggling in the colony. Attempts to find a
protest tradition among the working classes is a little more difficult. There may be a dim
reflection of the German Coast and Acadian popular protests in the New Orleans street
demonstrations that occurred in 1793, and perhaps in rural protest exemplified by the
Nachtitoches tumult. Shifts that occurred in the nature of the working class make the attempt
harder. Between the 1760’s and 1790’s slaves performed an increasing amount of the colony’s
labor.
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Attempts to find any kind of continuation of popular protest between the farmer protests
of 1768 and the slave revolts of 1793 is even more difficult still. In Africans in Colonial
Louisiana: The Development of Afro-Creole Culture in the Eighteenth Century, Gwendolyn Milo
Hall attempts to create a connection between lower class white workers and the rebellious slaves
of the 1790’s through their shared Jacobinism (that is, a desire for freedom from the legal and
social restrictions that governed their lives).369 If that is the case, then one may begin to trace the
intersection of Afro-creole protest traditions and Euro-creole protest traditions (including the
1768 rebellion). Gilbert C. Din raises serious concerns about whether there is evidence to back
Hall’s assertion.370 Din contends that several of the rumors of free/slave cooperation were
proven false by area Commandants, and that Spanish records lack references to such
cooperation.371 For the time being at least, there remains the possibility of, but no compelling
direct proof of, a connection between the popular protest of the 1760’s and the slave revolts of
the 1790’s.
The Spanish administrations themselves played a large role in determining whether the
French Creole colonists would, or could revolt. Through integration, or superiority, they could
have denied the colonists the impetus to enact a revolt. A lack of co-option of French creoles
into the system was never a source for discontent in the populace. The French Superior Council
and Governor were in power during the first revolt in Louisiana, and after the re-institution of
Spanish rule half of the sitting members of the New Orleans Cabildo were French creoles.
Governor Ulloa could hardly have included the French more in his government. But he may
have been including them at the wrong level. Ulloa succeeded in creating a layer of French
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administration under him that had no upward mobility in the Spanish system. Governor
Carondelet, in an attempt to stave off rebellion, re-introduced the syndic system of appointed
“best men” spread throughout the colony, men whose positions in society were enhanced by their
relations and service to Spain. The Spaniards had no superiority myth to justify their position of
dominance. Rather they had the well established tradition of European monarchy as a basis for
their ownership of the colony. This proved somewhat difficult as throughout the history of the
Spanish regime in Louisiana the French Creoles felt umbrage and a certain amount of disbelief
that they would be “traded away” and would not give up hope that he French monarch (or
eventually Republic) would accept them back – though the plantation owners that made up the
colonial elite in the 1790’s developed serious reservations about the abolitionist tendencies of the
Republic.
The mounting sense of relative deprivation, driven by economic policies instituted by the
Spanish government, was capitalized upon in both periods by parties interested in fomenting
revolution. Ulloa’s decision to implement the Cedula of 1768, limiting trade to approved
Spanish ports, provided the impetus for the rebellion against his administration. The Creole
merchants, guided in their perception of the policy changes by agitators like Lafrénière, saw
themselves as being denied what they considered to be customary, or “ancient rights and
liberties”.372 The new sense of deprivation caused by the trade restrictions compounded the
anxieties felt by colonists over the weak trade and lack of specie in the colony. In the Carondelet
administration there were also unpopular trade restrictions, brought about by wars with
customary trade partners – perhaps most notably the trade cessation with France in 1793. Again,
as Governor Ulloa did before him, Baron Carondelet tried to police and reduce illicit trade. And
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again this act was politicized as evidence of the Spanish interests running counter to the interests
of city merchants, and evidence that the Spanish regime wished to strip the colony of its ties to
France, and thus its French heritage. Likewise, Baron Carondelet’s attempts to enforce the
Cedula regarding the education and treatment of slaves of 1789 caused a great unease among the
colony’s large planters, giving them cause to see themselves as victimized by the Spanish
regime.
The presence, or lack thereof, of military forces useable for coercion was important to not
just the success of a rebellion, but of one’s occurrence. At the time of the 1768 rebellion
Governor Ulloa did not have sufficient military forces in the colony to resist the rebels. That was
an undeniable factor in the decision to rebel against the governor. The militias that he did have
to keep order were used sparingly, as Governor Aubry did not wish to provoke the discontented.
In the 1790’s Governor Carondelet also used his military sparingly, so as not to stretch his
limited forces too thin, or provoke the colonists into a greater spirit of rebellion. However,
Carondelet had forces to use, and the ability to call for reinforcements. In 1793 he displayed
those forces by mustering them at New Orleans.373 Carondelet also had the benefit of the
memory of the impression that O’Reilly made on the colony upon his arrival. Since O’Reilly’s
arrival, Spanish force was never in doubt.
O’Reilly’s administration also demonstrated how the colony could be controlled and
order restored in case of widespread active discontent. O’Reilly showed a mastery of all four of
Welch’s maxims of control. O’Reilly used criminal charges and the granting of pardons to
separate the rebel leaders from the base. By pomp and ceremony O’Reilly restored a degree of
faith in the majesty and authority of the Spanish crown, which was the justification of the
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Spanish occupation of the colony. He incorporated leading creoles into the Spanish system of
government, and in doing so involved them with government in a way that offered a more
permanent station. Finally, O’Reilly possessed the capability to coerce the creoles if need be,
and made sure to display that force prominently, but restrained from using that force unless it
was necessary.
Baron Carondelet also attempted to cast the actions of political actors in a purely criminal
way. In doing so, and later in trying to use the threat of slave revolt to scare planters into
supporting the Spaniards as their assurance of order, Carondelet was able to somewhat divide the
discontented. Through the Syndic system, and the appointment of local judges, he further
integrated the creoles and vested them into the success of the colony. Perhaps because of his
tendency to overreact to dangers, Baron Carondelet did all he could to ensure that he had ample
soldiers to contain a rebellion. In spite those tendencies, he also recognized that open hostilities
would cause a great many problems and refrained from using his men except at Natchitoches.
The weak Spanish presence in Louisiana greatly aided the politicization of discontent.
This is most radically evident when one juxtaposes the actions and stance of the Superior
Council in October 1768, with itself in August of 1769. The rebels knew they had little to fear
with Governors Ulloa and Aubry due to the lack of forces, weakness, and desire to accommodate
when confronted. Even with Aubry’s aid Ulloa did not have the man-power to intercede in the
rebel actions, even had he been aware of them earlier. For his part, Aubry contented himself to
issue stern warnings with little ability, or possibly even intent, of backing them up. The
administration failed to successfully enforce policies and regulations, particularly with regard to
smuggling. While this was arguably necessary to the survival of the colony, it greatly weakened
the perceived strength of the joint government.
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By contrast, Lieutenant General O’Reilly brought with him an overwhelming force, and
used it sparingly. In doing so O’Reilly maximized the benefit of a force as deterrent to rebel
action while minimizing the use of force as a contributing factor to discontent. O’Reilly
enforced the vast majority of his regulations and laws, creating the appearance of Spanish
authority. The only notable exception to O’Reilly’s success with enforcing regulation was the
non-enforcement of slave regulations.
The inability of the Spaniards to decisively regulate slavery from 1769 onward set the
stage for the troubles Baron Carondelet would have with slave regulation in the 1790’s. Baron
Carondelet struggled to improve the quality of slave care enough to prevent a slave insurrection.
The reluctance of the planter class to adopt his reforms, and impact of Jacobin ideology as well
as rumor of potential abolition or uprising on the slaves themselves thwarted the Baron’s efforts.
In the wake of the Point Coupee revolt, Carondelet’s tactics regarding slave pacification turned
toward stricter control, and in doing so brought the interests of the Spanish authority and the
planter class into closer alignment.
With regard to effective mobilization of his small forces, displays of force, and rapid
enhancement of his forces through loaned troops, as well as incorporation of well placed
colonists into the control structure as Syndics, Carondelet succeeded in preventing popular
revolts from capitalizing on a perceived weakness of Spanish authority. However the success of
popular unrest in France and the frequent threat of invasion from out of the colony allowed
agitators to use the possibility of a future moment of Spanish weakness as propaganda.
A greater threat to Spanish authority was the lack of police enforcement. This was seen
in both the inability to prevent popular demonstrations and to catch the arsonists that moved
about in New Orleans, and even more prominently in the lack of Spanish authority in the more
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remote rural villages. Nonetheless, Carondelet used the mostly adequate forces at his disposal
(and imported forces when necessary) to enforce most regulations in the colonial center, and
maintained enough control over the city to prevent that city from ever falling completely out of
his control. In doing so, Carondelet maintained the perception of a fairly strong Spanish
authority in the Louisiana colony.
Baron Carondelet was lucky in that he never had to face a united opposition behind a
character such as Nicolas Chauvin Lafrénière. Lafrénière’s strength of personality, powerful
oratory, personal connections and relatively high status and authority allowed him to become a
strikingly effective leader in the 1768 rebellion. These qualities allowed Lafrénière, and the
other coup leaders, to reach across large sections of the colonial community and organize a well
put together rebellion. Lafrénière’s contacts put him in position to disrupt the Spanish
government through Foucault, block payment to the Germans, and convince the Acadians that
Governor Ulloa was hording money meant to pay off their paper currency. They damned the
Spaniards and celebrated French culture, thus beginning the ideological indoctrination of the
rebels by drawing a sharp division between the interests of colonial Louisiana and the interests of
the Governor Ulloa.
Once the militias were gathered in New Orleans, the rebellious members of the Superior
Council printed circulars through which to present the militias, and the rest of New Orleans, with
the formal ideological foundations of the rebellion. This ideology combined a criticism of the
Spanish regime, outlined a set of immediate actionable points, and hinted at their vision of a new
colonial future without Spain – though they were ultimately unable to accomplish much after the
expulsion of Ulloa. This, as well as their already prominent positions in society, allowed the
Superior Council members to effectively position themselves as a desirable and effective
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replacement for the Spanish administration. The participants of the 1768 rebellion exercised
remarkable discipline in secrecy, time management, and self restraint. An organized and
disciplined force reveals good management skills on the part of the rebel leadership. Likewise
the ability of Lafrénière and company to reach across ethnic and economic gaps testifies to the
communication skills and persuasiveness of the coup members. The leadership of the rebellion
displayed some tactical skill, no doubt from the militia captains, in organizing the street patrols,
and spiking of the New Orleans cannons.
In the 1790’s no such strong organizing leadership, capable of uniting the disparate
interests of the discontented, emerged to challenge Carondelet’s authority. Rather Carondelet
faced a period of rebellious behavior, with small demonstrations – harrowing, but lacking the
coordination and skill that contributed to the danger and effectiveness of the 1768 rebellion.
New Orleans saw no shortage of revolutionary ideology entering from France and the United
States. However a galvanizing leadership did not present itself. The closest thing New Orleans
saw to such effective leadership was in the organization of merchants who signed petitions to the
king of France to retrocede the colony. However, they quailed in the presence of Carondelet’s
reinforcements from Havana. Likewise, in rural Nacthicohes Padre Delvaux proved effective in
organizing a small group of discontented to cohesive action, but that resistance did not last long
in the face of the relatively small Spanish force sent to disband it.
But effective pacification of a rebellion relies on well thought out concessions as well as
repression by coercion. Governor Ulloa never really had a chance to confront the Superior
Council conspirators. Had he spent time developing stronger channels of information, he might
have. The authority’s response to the 1768 rebellion fell instead to Lieutenant General Alejandro
O’Reilly. O’Reilly approached the colony with a mixture of overwhelming force, restraint,
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magnanimity, reform and aid. Using criminal proceedings for the leadership, combined with a
general amnesty, O’Reilly created a split in the rebellion – cutting the head off of the body, so to
speak. The Spanish funds he took with him and the economic reforms that ultimately benefitted
the colony lessened the discontent felt by the citizens, as did a sense of security from knowing
that the colony once again had the attentions of a European power.
But even Alejandro O’Reilly could not return the colony to a pre-rebellion state. Once
the rebellion occurred, the memory of the rebellion entered into the collective consciousness and
became an internalized part of the citizen’s dialogue with the ruling administration. Not only
would rebellion, once the colonists had some experience with it, be considered more of a viable
outlet for discontent, but the act of rebellion itself would act as a form of ascription. Opposition
to the entrenched power ties together the elements that participated in the revolt, possibly for
generations. Thus by the 1790s the Creoles of Louisiana had a tradition which included rebellion
as a form of dealing with relative discontent.
Baron Carondelet used the revived French syndic system both to incorporate creoles into
the Spanish system and to act as a highly effective communication network. This gave
Carondelet’s administration local agents to report what was happening in the more remote parts
of the colony and an avenue to control information going out to the colony – thus controlling
how events were perceived by releasing “official” versions of news, esp. via the Monituer. This
not only allowed Carondelet some ability to prevent the spread of discontent, it also allowed him
the opportunity to isolate any rebellious persons by criminalizing them in released news.
Carondelet also capitalized on the there being two different strains of rebellious persons in
Louisiana during his administration – slave and free. He argued successfully that any
movements toward French republicanism would lead to a slave revolt. This scared many of the
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large planters into allying with the governor for the early years of his time in the colony and
prevented that powerful faction from allying with other discontented groups. Not until he
decided to implement slave reform did the relationship between Carondelet and the planters sour.
Carondelet made a number of defensive improvements to the colony as well as civil and
administrative ones. However mounting economic troubles due to the wars, trade restrictions,
and anxiety over slave unrest built discontent, which was ignited by an influx of Jacobin and
republican propaganda which incited demonstrations in the streets of New Orleans. Likewise the
failure of Carondelet to successfully prosecute demonstrators led to a serious challenge to his
authority in the city of New Orleans, and even more so in the remote countryside where his
presence was considerably less felt. But the Governor was able to stave off large scale revolt.
Carondelet paired media control with a reinforced police and military force that he was able to
bolster with troops from Havana or Natchez when he needed them. Carondelet’s fear of large
scale revolt and lack of a sizeable military presence prevented him from overreacting with
military force in masse. The need for Carondelet to reserve his military forces for external
defense, which he had been bolstering with questionable alliances, also limited the extent to
which he could commit soldiers. Ultimately this forced moderation of commitment was
appropriate.
Compared against each other with Welch’s model as a guide, the two rebellions do reveal
certain commonalities. The distance of the colony from Spain played a large role in the relative
inability of the Spanish crown to regulate and control her. It also bred a sense of independence
in the colonists which was compounded by the decades of French “laissez faire”. Spanish
attempts at regulation, and bringing the colony into the Spanish mercantile system caused fear
and anxiety amongst the colonists who were already suffering from a continually depressed
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economy. Ethnicity was used to unite the colonists against the Spaniards, and in both instances
so was collective political violence in New Orleans alongside attempts to persuade the French
king to retrocede the colony. The ideology of both periods contained references to free trade and
natural rights – though the 1768 conspirators were no Jacobins.
The rebellions differed on a number of points. The degree of external influence, in terms
of ideology, was much higher in the 1790’s. The leadership of the 1768 rebellion was much
stronger, and the rebellion itself much more organized. By contrast the turmoil of the 1790’s
was scattered, and no strong leadership unified the multiple discontented groups into a cohesive
opposition. During the 1760’s the colonial government was organizationally divided,
unfocussed, weak, and only nominally aligned with its Spanish head. There was no apparatus for
the gathering or dissemination of intelligence, which allowed the rebels to catch the governors
unaware. The government in place during the 1790’s was stronger, more organized, and
extremely active in terms of seeking out potential rebellion. In the later years of the colonial
government a lot of energy was invested in gathering intelligence, disseminating propaganda and
incorporating the creoles into the colonial administration.
The differences are less pronounced in the conditions of relative deprivation that started
organized unrest. This reveals a continuity of problems that were almost systemic to the
Louisiana colony. Chief among these was the economic woes of the colony. The economy of
the Louisiana colony was perpetually weak due to an imbalance in imports versus exports. This
led to a “bleeding out” of specie, wild inflation and a damaging dependence on foreign trade.
These conditions, compounded by natural disaster and disease, produced an environment
engineered for discontent. With weak authority and poor governance this discontent easily
manifested itself in collective political violence as members of the discontented agitated against
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Spanish changes to systems they developed to survive in Louisiana. However, with strong
governance the colony was able to endure these conditions.
The study of these revolts together and against the “model” of revolt presented by Welch
suggests that they are different manifestations of popular discontent caused by systemic
economic, geographic or physical, and social problems. This suggests that they also fit the mold
of a “peasant revolt” as defined by Welch, as does the tendency for the agitators to seek limited
change in government to address specific and local ills. This indicates that perhaps, though the
Spanish regime is known to have implemented successful social and commercial reforms which
are widely thought to have begun Louisiana’s ascent toward being a profitable and stable land,
important problems could not be addressed in the context of a colonial system. Spaniards
adopted, and adapted various methods of control over the course of their administration of the
colony, but never managed to address the deeper causes of discontent in a fashion that would
have allowed them to keep the colony without future demonstrations. This was compounded by
the relatively rapid expansion of the Americans into their shared border space.
There remain a number of questions that were raised during the research of this thesis,
but were beyond the scope of this study, or for other reasons not fully explored, and a number of
avenues open to further investigation. It would be interesting to see how the results of these
rebellions can be compared to other rebellions in the Spanish new world over the length of
Spanish colonialism in America. Perhaps Welch’s models could be compared with the models
presented in William B. Taylor’s Drinking, Homicide and Rebellion in Colonial Mexican
Villages. Such lines of inquiry may shed light on Spanish methods of control, and how they
adapted to face changes in subjects from native tribes to European colonists, as well as any
impact of the eighteenth-century enlightenment on Spanish colonialism. Using Welch’s methods
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to compare the Spanish rebellions with North American rebellions that occur throughout the
second half of the eighteenth-century, particularly those in the British colonies and the United
States may, likewise, yield interesting results.
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